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ABSTRACT 
  In this Article, I claim that judges and jurors unknowingly 
misremember case facts in racially biased ways. Drawing upon studies 
from implicit social cognition, human memory research, and legal 
decisionmaking, I argue that implicit racial biases affect the way 
judges and jurors encode, store, and recall relevant case facts. I then 
explain how this phenomenon perpetuates racial bias in case 
outcomes. To test the hypothesis that judges and jurors misremember 
case facts in racially biased ways, I conducted an empirical study in 
which participants were asked to recall facts of stories they had read 
only minutes earlier. Results of the study confirmed the hypothesis 
that participants remembered and misremembered legally relevant 
facts in racially biased ways. For example, participants who read 
about an African-American story character were significantly more 
likely to remember aggressive facts from the story than participants 
who read about a Caucasian story character. Other results indicated 
that these racial memory biases were not related to explicit racial 
preferences. 
  The presence and power of implicit memory bias in legal 
decisionmaking raises concerns about the legal system’s ability to 
achieve social justice. Multifaceted responses, including debiasing 
techniques and cultural change efforts, are needed. Debiasing 
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techniques, which use interventions such as diversity training to lessen 
the negative effects of implicit bias, hold promise for at least 
temporarily reducing the harms of implicit memory bias. The 
response with the greatest permanent potential, however, requires 
embracing cultural responsibility for the presence of negative racial 
stereotypes and coordinating efforts for change. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction............................................................................................. 347 
I. Implicit Racial Bias Exposed: Psychological Evidence  
and Legal Discourse .................................................................... 351 
A. Psychological Evidence of Implicit Racial Bias..................... 353 
1. Implicit Social Cognition ..................................................... 354 
2. Explicit Racial Preference, Implicit Bias, and  
Social Dominance ......................................................... 360 
3. Cultural Responsibility for Implicit Racial Attitudes 
and Stereotypes............................................................. 362 
B. Connecting Implicit Biases and Legal Theory....................... 364 
II. Misremembering Legal Facts in Racially Stereotyped Ways..... 373 
A. Memory Errors Are Normal and Meaningful........................ 374 
B. Stereotypes Drive Recall Errors and False Memory 
Generation.............................................................................. 376 
C. Legal Memories Gone Wrong:  
Source Attribution Errors..................................................... 381 
D. Connecting Memories to Decisionmaking ............................. 384 
E. Can Deliberations Cure Memory Errors?.............................. 387 
III. Forgotten Equality: An Empirical Study...................................... 390 
A. Methods...................................................................................... 390 
1. Participants ............................................................................ 390 
2. Materials ................................................................................ 391 
B. Hypotheses................................................................................. 397 
C. Limitations of the Study ........................................................... 397 
D. Results: Failed Memories and Racial Minorities................... 398 
1. Remembering and Misremembering Aggression in 
The Confrontation......................................................... 398 
2. Remembering and Misremembering Mitigating 
Factors in The Confrontation....................................... 401 
3. Instances of Failed Recall and False Memory in 
Employment Story........................................................ 402 
4. Implicit Memory Bias and Explicit Racial Preferences ... 404 
02__LEVINSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:48:07 AM 
2007] FORGOTTEN RACIAL EQUALITY 347 
IV. Implicit Biases, Cultural Responsibility, and Debiasing............. 406 
A. Debiasing of Memory Errors and Stereotypes ...................... 407 
1. Improving Memory Accuracy and Reducing False 
Memories ....................................................................... 407 
2. Temporarily Reducing Implicit Biases............................... 411 
3. Future Directions.................................................................. 417 
B. Cognitive Biases, Cultural Change, and Social Justice ......... 417 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 420 
Appendix A:  Dependent Variable Measures..................................... 422 
Appendix B:  Individual Recall Results............................................... 424 
THE CONFRONTATION 
  Tyronne, a 23 year old African American man, first encountered 
James when they accidentally bumped elbows in a crowded bar. An 
hour after leaving the bar, Tyronne and a friend spotted James 
outside a local diner. They approached James slowly, and Tyronne 
said: “Why did you bump into me back there?” James said: “Hey 
listen . . .it sounds like you had too much to drink. Let it go.” 
Tyronne’s friend took a step towards James and said: “What if we 
won’t let it go?” When he took another step towards James, James 
moved forward, shoved him with both hands, and said: “Get out of 
my face.” Without hesitating, Tyronne then stepped forward and tried 
to shove James in the chest, but missed and hit him in the face. James 
fell back slightly. He then turned around, took a couple steps away 
from Tyronne, and appeared to reach for something in his pocket. 
Tyronne quickly pursued James from behind and punched him in the 
side of the head. James fell to the ground. Tyronne’s friend stepped 
forward and kicked James. 
INTRODUCTION 
Judges and jurors may unintentionally and automatically 
“misremember” facts in racially biased ways during all facets of the 
legal decisionmaking process. In delegating both factfinding and 
decisionmaking authority to judges and juries, the American legal 
system makes a supposedly elementary but unsupported 
psychological assumption—that these individuals can cognitively 
process, evaluate, and weigh the facts that were presented during 
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trial.1 The accuracy of this assumption has been challenged by 
behavioral law and economics scholars, who have demonstrated that 
cognitive biases affect the way people process information.2 Yet 
perhaps an even more vulnerable part of this psychological 
assumption is implicated by systematic biases in memory recall. 
Unlike most cognitive biases, which are assumed to operate 
independent of race, unintentionally biased memory failures by 
judges and jurors may propagate racial biases through the legal 
process itself. Despite this challenge to basic assumptions of legal 
decisionmaking, scholarship has not yet examined whether judicial 
factfinders and decisionmakers systematically “misremember” facts in 
racially biased ways. This Article undertakes such an examination and 
concludes that implicit memory biases taint the legal decisionmaking 
process. 
Since the late 1980’s, legal scholars have identified various ways 
in which unconscious or implicit racial biases3 influence the legal 
 
 1. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551 (2004) (“The prevailing trial design rests on the assumption 
that the complex and vast amount of testimony, presented over the course of days and weeks, 
can be encoded, retained, and retrieved from memory in an unaltered state. . . . [But] [t]he 
findings from coherence-based reasoning research are markedly inconsistent with these 
assumptions.”). 
 2. These scholars aim to create a psychologically accurate model of legal decisionmaking. 
See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1489–1508 (1998); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining 
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99–101 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1256–92 (2003); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 
588–95 (1998). Some cognitive biases, such as the hindsight bias, operate in close connection 
with memory processes. See Rachlinski, supra at 575. By separating behavioral law and 
economics discussions from my discussion of implicit memory biases, I do not mean to imply 
that other cognitive biases do not involve memory. To the contrary, many cognitive biases, such 
as hindsight bias, the availability heuristic, and primacy/recency effects, operate inextricably 
with the human memory. 
 3. Early legal scholarship frequently referred to “unconscious” racism and drew upon 
psychoanalytic models, such as Charles Lawrence’s use of Freudian discourse. See Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 331–36 (1987). Subsequent legal scholarship has relied upon scientific 
methodology rather than Freudian discourse, and therefore uses the term “implicit” to describe 
attitudes, memories, and stereotypes that are outside of “conscious, attentional control.” 
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1489, 1497–1539 (2005) (explaining the foundations of scientific research on implicit attitudes). 
While the words “implicit” and “unconscious” describe similar concepts, some psychologists 
have cautioned against using them interchangeably because people can occasionally possess 
some awareness of their automatic and implicit attitudes. See Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. 
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process.4 One significant methodology has involved examining the 
specific harms caused by implicit racial biases, such as the connection 
between implicit racial attitudes and acts of employment 
discrimination.5 Another methodology has involved evaluating the 
unintentional biasing implications of legislative and administrative 
efforts.6 As scientific research methods continue to improve in rigor, 
scholars continue to learn more about the implicit nature of racial 
biases and stereotypes and how the legal system frequently ignores 
them. 
Shifting gears momentarily, I now return to The Confrontation, 
the story presented at the beginning of this Article (but please do not 
look back at the story just yet). Here is a brief memory quiz about the 
story. Do the following facts accurately describe a piece of The 
Confrontation story? (Answer yes or no to each question.) (1) 
Tyronne kicked James. (2) James pushed Tyronne. (3) Tyronne tried 
to push James in the chest, but missed and hit him in the face. Does 
the quiz seem easy? Well, it might (check the answers in the footnote 
below).7 But make the facts slightly more complicated (like a real 
case), and it might be harder to remember.8 And simply change 
Tyronne’s race from African American to Caucasian (and his name to 
William) and some facts may actually be remembered differently. Not 
 
Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meanings and Use, 54 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003). See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of implicit social 
cognition, including examples of how researchers measure implicit racial attitudes and biases. 
See infra Part II for examples of scholarship on memory, a field that uses the term “implicit,” 
and, in particular, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 3, at 947 (citing Daniel Schacter, 
Implicit Memory: History and Current Status, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: LEARNING, 
MEMORY & COGNITION 501 (1987)). In this Article, I generally use the term “implicit” rather 
than “unconscious,” except when reviewing research (such as Lawrence’s) that uses the term 
“unconscious.” 
 4. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1549–50; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1166–86 (1995); Lawrence, supra note 3, at 342–43. 
 5. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 4, at 1170. 
 6. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1568. 
 7. Here are the quiz answers. Question 1: No. This statement is inaccurate. Tyronne did 
not kick James. Tyronne’s friend kicked James. Question 2: No. This statement is also 
inaccurate. James pushed Tyronne’s friend, not Tyronne. Question 3: Yes. This statement is 
accurate. 
 8. Research has suggested that jurors may not remember much more than half of the 
information presented at trial. See Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Does Jury 
Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ Memories?, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 589, 600 
(2002) (finding mock jurors who watched a thirty-five minute video of a case “could remember 
only about 60% of the trial material tested”). 
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convinced? Read on, or perhaps skip ahead to the empirical study I 
conducted,9 which illustrates that these memory-driven implicit biases 
can occur in a systematic fashion. 
The empirical study I conducted investigated whether implicit 
racial bias affects how mock jurors remember legal facts. I asked 
study participants to read the facts of legal stories (one is an 
expanded version of The Confrontation10), briefly distracted their 
attention,11 and then quizzed their memories of the facts. The actors’ 
race served as the independent variable—people read about either 
William (a Caucasian), Kawika (a Hawaiian), or Tyronne (an African 
American).12 The results of the study demonstrate that the race of a 
civil plaintiff or a criminal defendant can act implicitly to cause 
people to misremember a case’s facts in racially biased ways. For 
example, study participants who read about Tyronne were more 
likely to remember aggressive facts from The Confrontation than 
were study participants who read about William.13 The results also 
show that susceptibility to misremembering facts based on race 
cannot be attributed simply to more overtly racist people—those who 
were susceptible to racial misremembering sometimes embraced less 
explicitly racist attitudes. 
This Article, including the empirical study I conducted, brings 
together theories and methods from both legal discourse on 
unconscious racism and psychology studies of implicit social cognition 
and memory processes. It is structured as follows: Part I begins by 
offering psychological evidence of implicit racial bias. It details 
studies in which people’s implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes have 
been measured in novel, yet methodically rigorous ways. Then it 
looks at how legal commentators have incorporated this psychological 
knowledge into critiques of legal theory. It notes that little or no 
 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 11. I attempted to create a similar effect for readers of this Article by pausing after 
presenting The Confrontation for two paragraphs before asking the basic recall questions. 
Almost all memory studies on recall provide a brief distraction task between presenting the task 
and testing recall. See infra Part II for examples of memory studies. 
 12. For one case, participants read an expanded version of The Confrontation. In the other 
story they read about an employment termination scenario. Names and races were similarly 
varied in the independent variable condition. In both cases, participants were told the race of 
the actor in the story they read. Thus, for example, participants who read about “William” were 
explicitly told in the story that William was Caucasian. 
 13. For detailed results, see infra Part III. 
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empirical work has been conducted to determine whether implicit 
racial bias may affect judge and juror memories of case facts. 
Part II investigates the intricacies and errors of human memory 
processes and discusses the intimate connection between memory and 
legal decisionmaking. Based upon the research discussed in Parts I 
and II, I argue that implicit bias likely affects legal decisionmaking by 
altering judge and jury memories of case facts. Part III details the 
empirical study I conducted, which tested whether manipulating the 
race of actors in a legal scenario would affect how accurately people 
recalled the story’s events. The study showed that for some facts, 
simply altering a legal actor’s race caused participants to remember 
certain facts or generate false memories in racially biased ways. 
Part IV begins by pointing out that implicit biases are not errors 
caused by scientific quirks, but are meaningful manifestations of 
social and cultural norms. Yet until a broader cultural solution to 
implicit biases emerges through time, learning, and change strategies, 
the legal decisionmaking process will continue to transmit racial 
biases implicitly. Thus, this Part addresses a debiasing model that can 
help moderate or even temporarily eliminate implicit memory biases. 
These solutions include (1) using debiasing techniques to block 
stereotypes and enhance memory, (2) striving for more 
counterstereotypic legal professionals and more diverse juries, and 
(3) implementing more widespread procedural changes such as juror 
note taking and question asking. 
I.  IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS EXPOSED:  
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 
Since the 1990’s, a number of studies have deconstructed the 
complicated ways in which the human mind maintains and manifests 
racially biased implicit attitudes14 and stereotypes.15 Many of these 
 
 14. According to social cognition researchers, an “attitude” is “an evaluative disposition—
that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or 
something.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 3, at 948. A racial attitude, for example, would be 
the tendency to like or dislike members of a certain race. Researchers define an “implicit 
attitude” as “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience 
that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category.” Id. (citing Anthony 
Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and 
Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995)). 
 15. According to social cognition researchers, a social “stereotype” is “a mental association 
between a social group or category and a trait.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 3, at 949. One 
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studies have reached the same conclusion—that implicit biases16 are 
real, pervasive, and difficult to change.17 Responding to the growing 
scientific proof of implicit bias, legal commentators have called for 
various types of reform.18 Reform-minded scholars have, for example, 
focused on the relationship between discriminatory acts triggered by 
implicit bias (such as employment decisions) and the failure of legal 
rules to properly guard against or provide recourse for such acts.19 
These works often critique a substantive legal rule or construct (such 
as the intent doctrine20) in light of psychological evidence that 
indicates that such rule or construct fails to truly understand the 
implicit nature of racism.21 Although such works have made great 
progress in discussing the relationship between substantive legal rules 
and implicit racial bias, less progress has been made in studying how 
implicit racial bias affects legal processes such as judicial rulings and 
jury decisionmaking.22 
In order to develop fully a theory on how implicit racial bias 
might affect judicial rulings and jury decisionmaking, I draw on three 
distinct areas of scholarship on implicit bias: (1) empirical 
psychological studies that document various forms of implicit racial 
bias, (2) detailed legal arguments that call for reform of legal tests to 
match cognitive and racial realities, and (3) cognitive science studies 
 
example is the stereotype that elderly people drive slowly. Id. Greenwald and Krieger point out 
that stereotypes can be positive or negative. Id. at 950. 
 16. According to Greenwald and Krieger, a bias is “a displacement of people’s responses 
along a continuum of possible judgments.” Id. at 950. Implicit biases are “discriminatory biases 
based upon implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.” Id. at 951. 
 17. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 
1321 (2002); Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: 
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998). 
 18. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1568–72; Krieger, supra note 4, at 1241–47; Lawrence, supra 
note 3, at 355–56. 
 19. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1169. 
 20. See infra notes 93–98. 
 21. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1213; Lawrence, supra note 3, at 324–25. 
 22. Some authors, such as those examining peremptory challenges, focus on the 
intersection of substantive rules and legal processes. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: 
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 180–207 (2005) 
(thoroughly outlining research on implicit racial bias); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 
1553 (2004) (empirically examining and finding implicit bias even among a group of death 
penalty defense lawyers); Darren Seiji Teshima, A “Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy”: The Model 
Minority and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 
122, 133–36 (2006) (focusing on the role of implicit bias in grand jury foreperson selection). 
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that show the fragility of the human memory and connect memory 
failures to racial biases. This Part tackles the first two of these areas, 
and Part II addresses the third. 
A. Psychological Evidence of Implicit Racial Bias 
Implicit racial bias materializes in various forms and can affect 
the legal process in many ways. One possible, and troubling, way that 
implicit racial bias may manifest in legal decisionmaking is through 
biased memories. In this Article, I argue that implicit racial bias 
automatically causes jurors (and perhaps even judges)23 to 
misremember case facts in racially biased ways. These racially biased 
memory errors will distort case facts in ways that are completely 
unknown to the juror but prejudicial to the legal actor (for example, a 
criminal defendant or a plaintiff in an employment discrimination 
claim). Thus, the argument draws upon research in two related 
psychological areas—social cognition research and studies on human 
memory.24 Social cognition studies on bias explore the vast role of 
often automatic cognitive processes in decisionmaking. Memory 
studies, including those conducted using social cognition 
methodologies, reveal the vast powers of the human mind, but also 
the systematic failures of the human mind’s ability to recall certain 
facts. In combination with memory theories that reveal systematic 
shortcomings of human recall, social cognition research provides 
 
 23. In this Article, I argue that implicit memory biases will likely affect both juries and 
judges. Some readers might prefer to see me address only jury decisionmaking in this context. 
After all, the empirical study I conducted focuses more closely on mock jurors, not on judges. 
Nonetheless, in light of evidence detailing systematic errors in a wide range of human 
cognitions, it is important not to leave judges out of the discussion. Research on judicial versus 
jury decisionmaking biases appears to corroborate the decision to include judges as possible 
propagators of implicit memory bias. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (finding that judges, although sometimes less susceptible to 
biases than other experts and laypersons, still exhibit systematic cognitive biases); Donald C. 
Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1994) (arguing that a judge’s background, 
beliefs, and attitudes result in “many distorted and systematically biased decisions”); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 469, 505 (2005) (“There are certain types of errors that are made by both jurors 
and judges.”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2005) (finding that “some 
types of highly relevant, but inadmissible, evidence influenced judges’ decisions” but that 
“judges were able to resist the influence of such information in at least some cases”). For the 
sake of brevity, this Article will only occasionally repeat “and judges.” 
 24. Some research on memory falls under the umbrella of social cognition because of its 
focus on cognitive processes. For conceptual ease, I review research in memory studies and 
errors, infra Part II, separately from research on social cognition, infra Part I. 
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empirically solid ground for the prediction that implicit racial 
attitudes and stereotypes are powerful enough and scientifically 
reliable enough to affect jury memories in biased ways. 
1. Implicit Social Cognition.  Much of the existing evidence of 
implicit racial bias comes from the field of social cognition.25 Social 
cognition research analyzes how people think about themselves and 
others,26 often using methods from cognitive psychology to investigate 
how the human mind works.27 The area of social cognition thus 
includes work on a wide range of topics, including attribution theory, 
schemas, the self, reasoning processes and decisionmaking, memory, 
and attitudes.28 It should come as no surprise, then, that social 
cognition research also examines stereotypes, biases, and intergroup 
relations. In her groundbreaking work on unconscious bias and 
employment discrimination, Linda Hamilton Krieger provides three 
overarching themes of social cognition research on biases and 
stereotypes, each of which she relates to bias in the workplace: (1) 
normal cognitive processes automatically trigger stereotyping,29 (2) 
stereotypes and biases operate absent an explicit intent to use them,30 
and (3) “people’s access to their own cognitive processes is in fact 
poor.”31 Thus, studies in social cognition have illustrated that racial 
attitudes and stereotypes are both automatic and implicit. That is, 
people possess attitudes and stereotypes over which they have little or 
no “conscious, intentional control.”32 
A now-famous example of social cognition research on implicit 
racial bias comes from Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald, and 
 
 25. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 3, at 1495–96. 
 26. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 19 (2d ed. 1991). 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Krieger, supra note 4, at 1188. See generally John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social 
Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996) (providing more background on the automaticity of 
stereotypes); John A. Bargh et al., The Generality of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect, 62 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893 (1992) (same). 
 30. Krieger, supra note 4, at 1188. 
 31. Id. Social cognition researchers label this as “dissociation”—the gap between implicit 
and explicit attitudes. See Fazio and Olson, supra note 3, at 303; Kang, supra note 3, at 1513; see 
also Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, Causes, 
and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129, 133 (2004) (summarizing the 
automatic, unintentional, and possibly unconscious nature of implicit biases). 
 32. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 3, at 946. 
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their colleagues, who began using the Implicit Association Test in the 
1990s.33 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) pairs an attitude object 
(such as a racial group) with an evaluative dimension (good or bad) 
and tests how response accuracy and speed indicate implicit and 
automatic attitudes34 and stereotypes.35 In the computerized version of 
the IAT, participants sit at a computer and keyboard and are asked to 
pair an attitude object (for example, Black or White, man or woman, 
fat or thin) with either an evaluative dimension (for example, good or 
bad) or an attribute dimension (for example, home or career, science 
or arts) by pressing a response key as quickly as they can.36 For 
example, in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together 
pictures of African-American faces with positive words from the 
evaluative dimension. The speed at which the participants can pair 
the words together signifies the strength of the attitude (or in the case 
of attributes, the strength of the stereotype).37 As described by 
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald, “[w]hen highly 
associated targets and attributes share the same response key, 
participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas when 
weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key, 
participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater 
difficulty.”38 As demonstrated by Banaji, Greenwald, and their 
colleagues’ in their landmark studies39 (and in numerous follow-ups),40 
 
 33. See Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 1464–65; Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 14, at 
14–19 (1995) (describing research demonstrating implicit stereotypes). 
 34. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 14, at 7–10; see also supra note 14 (providing a 
definition of “attitude”). 
 35. For more detail on implicit attitudes and use of the IAT to measure them, see 
Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123–24 (Henry L. Roediger, III et al. eds. 
2001), and Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 14, at 14–19. For a definition of “stereotype,” see 
supra note 15. 
 36. Banaji, supra note 35, at 123. 
 37. Id.; Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 1465. 
 38. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001). 
 39. See, e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 14, at 14–19. 
 40. Research on the IAT is quite voluminous, with one often contested area of study on the 
IAT relating to the validity of the measurements. See, e.g., C. Miguel Brendl et al., How Do 
Indirect Measures of Evaluation Work? Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice in the Implicit 
Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 760, 768–71 (2001); Alan J. Lambert et 
al., On the Predictive Validity of Implicit Attitude Measures: The Moderating Effect of Perceived 
Group Variability, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 114, 115–16 (2005). 
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study participants consistently demonstrate implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes in areas including race and gender, among others.41 The 
time measurement variable used in the IAT allows researchers to 
determine that it generally takes longer for people to group together, 
for example, images of Black faces with positive words than it does 
for them to group together Black faces and negative words.42 
Examination of hundreds of thousands of IATs taken on the IAT 
project’s website confirms the systematic display of implicit racial 
biases.43 
In addition to the evidence provided by the IAT, implicit racial 
bias has been documented using a variety of methodologies.44 One 
series of studies uses custom-made video games to examine the race-
 
 41. See, e.g., Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 1470–76 (describing IAT data showing 
biases in Korean-American perceptions about Japanese Americans, Japanese-American 
perceptions about Korean Americans, and White American perceptions about Black 
Americans); Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test 
to Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1022, 1027–31 
(2000) (using the IAT to measure gender self-concept); D. Maison et al., The Implicit 
Association Test as a Measure of Implicit Consumer Attitude, 32 POLISH PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 2 
(2001) (studying “implicit consumer attitudes with the use of the IAT”); Brian Nosek et al., 
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP 
DYNAMICS 101, 102 (2002) (reporting results from six hundred thousand IATs on the popular 
online website, including significant Black-White IAT results). Dozens of IAT tests are 
available at IAT Corp., Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 42. See Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 38, at 801; Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 
1474; Nosek et al., supra note 41, at 105 (reporting “respondents’ automatic preference for 
White relative to Black”). 
 43. Nosek et al., supra note 41, at 105. Although the results of these studies are compelling, 
it should be understood that not everyone demonstrates implicit bias on the IAT. There are a 
small number of people who show no preference on the various IAT’s, including the White-
Black IAT. Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. (2007) (authors’ courtesy copy at 10–26, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (reviewing the results of IAT’s taken on the http://projectimplicit.com 
website between 2000 and 2006). 
 44. Gary Blasi, Jerry Kang, Linda Hamilton Krieger and others have described some of 
these studies. See Gary Blasi, Critical Race Studies: Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons 
from Cognitive Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1246–54 (2002) (describing experiments 
demonstrating cognitive stereotyping); Kang, supra note 3, at 1510–11 (describing the use of 
MRI results to measure fear responses to Black and White faces); Krieger, supra note 4, at 
1191–98, 1202–03, 1205–06, 1207–08, 1210–11 (describing various experiments showing bias); see 
also Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral-Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1073–75 (2006) (documenting racial bias in hiring 
behavior and medical diagnoses); Kristin Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI., at 19.1, 19.3–19.13 (2007) (summarizing scholarship in implicit social 
cognition). 
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based phenomenon of “shooter bias.”45 This bias emerges when 
participants play a video game that instructs them to shoot 
perpetrators (who are holding guns) as fast as they can but not to 
shoot innocent bystanders (who are unarmed but holding a non-gun 
object, such as a cell phone).46 The “shooter bias” refers to 
participants’ propensity to shoot Black perpetrators more quickly and 
more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot 
White bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black 
bystanders.47 Studies have also shown that participants more quickly 
identify handguns as weapons after seeing a Black face, and more 
quickly identify other objects (such as tools) as nonweapons after 
seeing a White face.48 In these studies, participants are entirely 
unaware that they have even seen a White or Black face.49 The quick 
flashing image registers in the unconscious; participants are not 
consciously aware of the prime.50 The unconscious visual stimulus is 
 
 45. See Correll et al., supra note 17, at 1325; Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials 
and The Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122 (2006); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The 
Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185–86 (2001). Several of the original studies on shooter bias were reviewed 
by Kang, supra note 3, at 1525–28. 
 46. Correll et al., supra note 45, at 122; Correll et al., supra note 17, at 1315. In the earlier 
Correll study, the other non-gun objects were an aluminum can, a camera, and a wallet. Correll 
et al., supra note 17, at 1315. 
 47. Correll et al, supra note 17, at 1325; Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of 
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 399, 403 (2003). Most discussions of shooter bias focus on race in explaining the 
Black-White result differences. Another possibility in these studies is reflected by the concept of 
“colorism.” See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1489 
(1999). Jones notes that “[r]ace and skin color are distinct phenomena that sometime overlap.” 
Id. at 1493. Social cognition studies show that skin tone, like race, operates implicitly and 
triggers implicitly biased attitudes. See Nosek et al., supra note 43 (authors’ courtesy copy at 17). 
 48. Correll et al., supra note 45, at 120 (citing David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signals for 
the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88 (2004); Charles M. Judd et al., 
Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) 
Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2004); Payne, supra note 45; B. 
Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control 
in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2002)). 
 49. See Correll et al., supra note 45, at 122. 
 50. Id. This visual flashing technique is known as “priming.” A well-known example of a 
priming study is Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 806–08 (1995), in 
which the authors found that priming racial identity affects standardized test scores. For a legal 
article on priming, see Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in 
Juries: How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
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enough to change the accuracy and speed of identification of the gun 
or tool in a racially biased way. 
Faced with the results of these studies and the concern that 
“officers use race when making the decision to shoot,”51 researchers 
have continued to investigate the roots of shooter bias. Studies have 
linked shooter bias to culturally held racial stereotypes, which link 
Blacks to danger.52 This well-known racial stereotype may even 
manifest in brain processes that moderate responses to fear. In a 2006 
study, Joshua Correll and his colleagues looked at fluctuations in 
participants’ electrical brain activity (known as “event-related brain 
potentials”) while the participants played the shooter video game.53 
According to Correll and his colleagues, measuring event-related 
brain potentials can identify when people detect threats and when 
they have a desire to control a behavioral response.54 Correll and his 
colleagues found that as participants played the video game, racial 
discrepancies manifested in the electrical activity of the brain.55 That 
is, participants’ brain activity showed more threat-related brain 
activity for Black actors than White actors (even for Blacks without 
guns), and more control response activity for White actors compared 
to Black actors.56 These brain responses then correlated with the 
participants’ performance—the more biased brain activity they 
displayed, the more shooter bias they exhibited.57 
A third type of social cognition study revealing implicit racial 
bias uses word-completion tasks to show how people think about 
stereotypical words more quickly when stereotypes have been 
activated. These studies demonstrate that people can more quickly 
complete word fragments, identify stereotypic words, and pronounce 
stereotypic words when stereotypes have been activated compared to 
 
1059, 1065–70 (2005), which argues that placing citizens on juries alters their cultural and 
cognitive reference points and therefore changes their decisionmaking. 
 51. Correll et al., supra note 45, at 120. 
 52. Correll et al., supra note 17, at 1327; Correll et al., supra note 45, at 126. 
 53. Correll et al., supra note 45, at 121. 
 54. Id. These brain responses are known as P200 and N200 components, among others. Id. 
 55. Id. at 124–25. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 125. Biased results in brain activity and shooter bias also correlated with 
individual participants’ personal and cultural stereotypes. Id. 
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when they have not been activated.58 For example, a study by Daniel 
Gilbert and J. Gregory Hixon presented participants with lists of 
partially completed words and asked them to complete as many as 
possible during a short time period.59 Some of the words presented 
were stereotypically associated with Asians, such as the word 
“POLITE” (written as POLI_E, so that other words, such as “police,” 
could be formed during the word completion task).60 As participants 
completed the task, the experimenters exposed them either to a 
Caucasian or Asian research assistant, whose only role was to hold up 
cards containing the word fragments.61 The participation of this 
assistant was hypothesized to be significant enough to activate racial 
stereotypes and thus affect word completions.62 The hypothesis was 
correct. Participants who were presented the word fragments by an 
Asian assistant completed more words in a stereotype-consistent 
manner than those who were presented word fragments by a 
Caucasian assistant.63 This study and others like it indicate that 
implicit stereotypes manifest quickly and potentially harmfully in a 
variety of different ways, and that they seemingly do so automatically 
any time there is a stereotype-consistent cognitive opportunity. 
Projects using broader social science methodologies have 
revealed similar racial gaps, supporting the social cognition research. 
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan created fictitious 
character names and resumes and studied how real-world potential 
employers responded to “African-American-sounding names” 
compared to “White-sounding names.”64 Using the fictitious resumes, 
 
 58. Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do 
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation and 
Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522, 522–23 (2003). 
 59. Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and 
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991). 
 60. Id. Other words included “SHORT,” “SHY,” “RICE,” and “NIP.” Id. These words were 
obtained by asking twenty college students to name their stereotypes of Asians. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 511. 
 63. Id. The experimenters also tested how cognitive busyness affected stereotype-
consistent word completion. Id. at 510. The results reported in the text are for the non-busy 
participants. See id. at 511. When participants were distracted while performing their tasks, 
stereotypes were moderated in word completions. Id. When stereotypes were activated followed 
by an increase in participants’ activity, however, participants were even more likely to apply 
stereotypes. Id. at 513. 
 64. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 991, 992 (2004). 
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which also varied the experience of the imaginary applicant, the 
experimenters responded to real help wanted ads in Boston and 
Chicago.65 The results demonstrated that employers were more likely 
to call job applicants with White sounding names than African-
American sounding names.66 In fact, when accounting for the dual 
influence of racial name sound and prior job experience, the 
researchers found that a White name yielded as many callbacks as an 
additional eight years of experience.67 
Research in social cognition and related areas thus provides 
strong evidence that implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes are 
triggered by automatic cognitive processes in a variety of cognitive 
domains. Based upon this compelling evidence, it would not at all be 
surprising if implicit racial biases similarly infect yet another cognitive 
domain—that of memory. In Part III, I examine research on the 
human memory. Such research illustrates a close connection between 
memory errors and racial stereotypes. In the memory domain, as well 
as in implicit social cognition more generally, the manifestations of 
implicit racial bias often conflict with a person’s explicit attitudes 
about race. This conflict is illustrated by the gap between implicit 
attitudes and explicit preferences. 
2. Explicit Racial Preference, Implicit Bias, and Social 
Dominance.  One particularly interesting characteristic of implicit 
racial attitudes is that they frequently diverge from explicit racial 
attitudes. That is, people who display strong implicit biases are often 
not the same people who demonstrate strong explicit biases.68 
According to Patricia Devine, “Even those who consciously renounce 
prejudice have been shown to have implicit or automatic biases that 
conflict with their nonprejudiced values.”69 For example, Correll and 
his colleagues evaluated “shooter” video game participants on game 
performance (an implicit measure) and also asked them about their 
racial preferences (an explicit measure).70 Results showed that explicit 
measures of racial preferences did not correlate with results for the 
 
 65. Id. at 991. 
 66. Id. at 997–98. 
 67. Id. at 998. 
 68. See Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? 
Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 757 (2001). Social 
cognition researchers call this divergence “dissociation.” See Kang, supra note 3, at 1513. 
 69. Devine, supra note 68, at 757. 
 70. Correll et al., supra note 17, at 1322. 
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video game.71 That is, people who exhibited greater amounts of 
shooter bias were not necessarily the same ones who endorsed more 
racially unequal preferences.72 A related and somewhat surprising 
finding was that members of bias-affected groups sometimes 
harbored implicit biases against their own group. For example, Banaji 
and Greenwald found that women and men both display implicit 
gender stereotypes that are sometimes negative toward women.73 
Similarly, Brian Nosek and his colleagues reported that older people 
(those over sixty) and younger people (those in their twenties) show a 
similar implicit preference for young over old.74 
One measure of explicit racial attitudes is the Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) scale. SDO is a measure that is designed to show 
an individual’s preference for social hierarchy.75 According to Felicia 
Pratto, Jim Sidanius, and their colleagues, a social dominance 
orientation is “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group 
dominate and be superior to out-groups.”76 The scale they developed 
to test SDO has been accepted as a measure of explicit racial 
preferences and has been used by social psychologists to predict anti-
Black racism as well as other explicit racial preferences.77 In the 
empirical study I conducted on memory bias and race, presented in 
Part III, I employed the SDO scale. I conducted this test in order to 
determine whether implicit memory biases, if they do in fact exist, are 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. Not all studies show no relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes. Some 
studies reveal at least a weak correlation between the two. E.g., Fazio & Olson, supra note 3, at 
304 (observing that there is “no simple answer” to the issue of whether and how implicit and 
explicit attitudes are related, but nonetheless suggesting that both are predictive of behavior in 
different ways); Wilhelm Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between the 
Implicit Association Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1369, 1382 (2005) (finding a relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes). 
 73. Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments 
of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 194 (1995). 
 74. Nosek et al., supra note 43 (authors’ courtesy copy at 10). 
 75. Felicia Pratto et al., Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting 
Social and Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741, 742 (1994). See 
generally JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY 
OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) (discussing social dominance theory). 
 76. Pratto et al., supra note 75, at 742. 
 77. To confirm validity, Pratto and her colleagues simultaneously tested their SDO 
measure along with several explicit racism measures. Id. at 745. Results indicated that the SDO 
measured racism well. Id. at 747. For each of these measures, there were significant correlations, 
indicating that the SDO agrees with these other scales. Id. For the fourteen-item SDO 
dependent variables, see infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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related to explicit racial attitudes.78 If the two are related, such that 
jurors who exhibit implicit racial bias also exhibit explicit racial 
preferences, potential legal solutions might include employing explicit 
racial preference questionnaires for jurors. Such screenings would 
thus block both explicitly biased and implicitly biased jurors from 
participating in decisionmaking. If implicit memory bias and explicit 
racial attitudes are not related, however, then dealing with such biases 
becomes significantly harder. 
3. Cultural Responsibility for Implicit Racial Attitudes and 
Stereotypes.  Who or what is responsible for implicit racial biases? 
Surprisingly few of the legal projects on implicit racial bias have 
examined the causes of the biases or discuss the probable link 
between historical and cultural discrimination and implicit racial 
biases.79 Psychologists, however, often discuss the causes of implicit 
biases and stereotypes. According to Laurie Rudman, Jon Jost, and 
others, a variety of factors, including one’s desire to maintain social 
order, cause implicit biases.80 System Justification Theory, for 
example, posits that people sometimes act automatically to maintain a 
structure of social order.81 This implicit need for social order, which 
often conflicts with a person’s explicit preferences, could be one 
direct link between a culture of racial subordination and implicit 
racial bias. 
In a study investigating how the desire to maintain social order 
may influence implicit attitudes, Professor Rudman and her 
colleagues tested the link between group status and implicit (versus 
 
 78. See infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032–33 (2006) (arguing that some legal scholars tend 
to propose legal solutions to the IAT without investigating alternative causes for the IAT’s 
results, such as knowledge of racial inequalities in society). 
 80. John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of 
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 6 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004) 
(connecting “implicit, nonconscious levels of awareness” with “an ideological motive to justify 
the existing social order”); Rudman, supra note 31, at 135–37 (identifying past experiences, 
emotional reconditioning, cultural biases, and cognitive balance as other potential causal links). 
 81. See Jost et al., supra note 80, at 912. System Justification Theory evidence shows, for 
example, that many members of minority groups harbor negative stereotypes about their own 
groups. Id. at 884. For a discussion of System Justification Theory in law and social justice, see 
Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Legal 
Advocacy and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1144–62 (2006). 
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explicit) group favoritism.82 They found that members of less-favored 
minority groups (such as overweight people and poor people) 
implicitly preferred more favored minority groups (such as Asians 
and Jews) to their own groups, but that these preferences only 
operated implicitly.83 The results indicated that the lower the cultural 
status of the group, the more likely that members of that group would 
demonstrate “automatic ingroup devaluation.”84 This research 
suggests that although people may act or speak out (explicitly) to 
reject social ordering of preferred groups, they may possess implicit 
motivation to maintain social and cultural hierarchies, even when it 
means disfavoring their own group. In the legal setting, System 
Justification Theory could explain how an implicit memory bias might 
act to similarly subordinate members of disfavored groups.85 
The connection between implicit biases and maintaining social 
order (at the expense of low cultural status groups) is not surprising. 
After all, it is quite intuitive that implicit biases reflect societal 
stereotypes. Research on stereotype formation and maintenance 
confirms that stereotypes are instilled at an early age and come from 
cultural and societal beliefs.86 According to Antony Page, 
psychologists have found that stereotypes arise when a person is as 
young as three years old and are usually learned from parents, peers, 
and the media.87 As people grow older, their stereotypes become 
implicit and remain mostly unchanged even as they develop 
nonprejudiced explicit views.88 Howard Ehrlich states, “Stereotypes 
about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of 
society. . . . [And] [n]o person can grow up in a society without having 
learned the stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.”89 
 
 82. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Minority Members’ Implicit Attitudes: Automatic Ingroup Bias 
as a Function of Group Status, 20 SOC. COGNITION 294, 294 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 312. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Blasi & Jost, supra note 81, at 1119. 
 86. See Page, supra note 22, at 193–98, 203–04. Stereotypes are a key ingredient in recall 
errors and in false memory generation. See infra Part II.B. 
 87. Page, supra note 22, at 203–04; Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and 
Socialization Influences on Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP PROCESSES 65, 73–76 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 
2001). 
 88. Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101, 103–04 
(2000). 
 89. Page, supra note 22, at 203 (citing HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973)). 
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B. Connecting Implicit Biases and Legal Theory 
Most legal discussions of implicit bias focus on the disharmony 
between legal tests for discrimination (which require explicit, 
intentional racism)90 and the psychological reality of discrimination 
(which is often implicit and does not meet traditional definitions of 
intent).91 These projects meaningfully incorporate empirical research 
on implicit racial bias into substantive legal models and suggest that 
legal standards must evolve toward understanding the true workings 
of racial bias. This lesson is powerful. But there are other lessons to 
be learned from the new research on implicit bias. Most projects have 
focused on the role of unconscious or implicit bias in the 
discriminatory act or mental state of the perpetrator of 
discrimination. They have not focused on the decisionmaking 
implications of this new research. Specifically, few projects have 
investigated how racial biases affect the implicit cognitive processes of 
judges and juries.92 Nonetheless, the concepts of unconscious racism 
and implicit racial bias are well established in legal scholarship. 
In what is credited as the most influential legal article on 
unconscious racism, Charles Lawrence challenged equal protection 
discourse with a psychological theory of unconscious discrimination.93 
“[W]e are all racists,” he proclaimed, and noted that “most of us are 
unaware of our racism.”94 Drawing upon research in both Freudian 
analysis and cognitive psychology, Lawrence questioned how the 
 
 90. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1161 (describing Title VII’s intent requirement and 
questioning “the premise that discrimination necessarily manifests intent or motive”); 
Lawrence, supra note 3, at 323 (“[R]equiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a 
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of 
what we understand about how the human mind works. . . . [E]qual protection doctrine must 
find a way to come to grips with unconscious racism.”). 
 91. See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1211 (critiquing the continuing tension between disparate 
treatment and new knowledge on unconscious racism); see also Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 
1064–65 (discussing the concept of “behavioral realism,” and the need to compare legal doctrine 
to psychological reality). For a similar call in a different legal context, see Justin D. Levinson, 
Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook 
Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L.J. 1, 1 (2005) (“[P]olicymakers develop law related to the 
human mind without an understanding of the human mind itself.”). 
 92. Scholarship in the area of race and juries for the most part focuses either on the 
ultimate decision of the jury or on areas like eyewitness identification. These projects often 
overlook the powerful workings of unconscious bias in the various stages of legal 
decisionmaking. For a discussion of some of the existing work on race and eyewitness 
identification, see infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 93. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 319–27. 
 94. Id. at 322. 
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Washington v. Davis95 discriminatory purpose doctrine96 reflected an 
American culture that consistently propagates discrimination, most of 
which is unconscious.97 The intent doctrine, Lawrence argued, not 
only misses the mark because of the scientific reality of unconscious 
racism, but in doing so fails to carry out the historical call for justice 
central to the Equal Protection Clause.98 Since Lawrence first 
published this argument, a heavily empirical field of psychology—
highlighted by implicit social cognition findings—developed to 
support his contentions. Even the field of cultural psychology, which 
had been a mere embryo when Lawrence wrote in 1987 and which 
blossomed in the 1990’s, was born from an idea similar to Lawrence’s 
discussion of culture—that cultural knowledge, norms, and 
experiences constantly shape the way societal members think, feel, 
and perceive reality.99 This nascent scientific field has begun to help 
deconstruct cognitive biases (by illustrating their cultural 
limitations),100 and it lends support to Lawrence’s theory that the 
cultural foundations of unconscious racial discrimination must be 
investigated and understood. 
 
 95. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 96. Id. at 239. 
 97. See generally Lawrence, supra note 3 
 98. See id. at 325–26. 
 99. See Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 961 (1984); Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology - 
What Is It, in CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1 (James W. Stigler et al. eds., 1990); see also 
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS 
THINK DIFFERENTLY . . . AND WHY 29 (2003) (discussing the different habits of thought 
between the East and the West); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & 
RECONCILIATION IN POST–CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 86–97 (1999) (discussing the role of 
cultural norms in stereotype formation); Li-Jun Ji et al, Culture, Change, and Prediction, 12 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 450, 450 (2001) (discussing how Chinese and Americans perceive change 
differently); Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese 
Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949, 949 
(1994) (discussing dispositionalism in attribution for behavior in individualist versus collectivist 
cultures). For legal articles discussing the intersection of cultural psychology and law, see Justin 
D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological 
Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
195, 195 (2004) [hereinafter Levinson & Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts], which 
highlights cultural differences in cognitive biases, causation attributions, and foreseeability 
predictions in the United States and China Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Valuing Cultural 
Differences in Behavioral Economics, 4 ICFAI J. BEHAV. FIN. 32, 45 (2007) [hereinafter 
Levinson & Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences] (on file with the Duke Law Journal), which 
argues for a cultural model of behavioral economics; and Levinson, supra note 91. 
 100. See Levinson & Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts, supra note 99, passim; 
Levinson & Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences, supra note 99, at 34. 
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Outside of equal protection discourse, a major area of focus on 
unconscious racism and implicit racial bias has been in the 
employment discrimination arena. Scholars have debated not only 
whether implicit racial bias actually affects employment decisions, but 
also how employment law doctrine should change (or not change) to 
incorporate a better understanding of how racism truly works. In an 
early major project in this area, Linda Hamilton Krieger discussed 
subtle forms of racism in Title VII employment discrimination cases, 
arguing that disparate treatment jurisprudence incorrectly assumes 
motivational, rather than cognitive, bases for discrimination.101 
Although employment discrimination law’s assumptions about the 
nature of discrimination may have been accepted historically by 
scientists, she claimed, “these assumptions have been so undermined, 
both empirically and theoretically, that they can no longer be 
considered valid.”102 To illustrate the gap between the law’s focus on 
conscious motivation and empirical evidence revealing unconscious 
racism, Krieger reviewed social cognition studies beginning in the 
1960s, starting with research demonstrating the automatic nature of 
in-group and out-group categorization. For example, Krieger 
described a 1973 study by Billig and Tajfel that indicated that people 
chose to allocate monetary rewards to in-group members rather than 
out-group members, even when greater fairness and mutual gain 
would have been achieved using other allocations.103 Bridging 
empirical findings and antidiscrimination policy, Krieger suggested 
reformulating disparate treatment doctrine to allow proof that group 
status played a role in causing an employment decision. This change 
would alter courts’ focus from an intent standard (whether an 
employer intended that race make a difference in an employment 
decision) to a causation standard (whether race or group status ‘made 
a difference’ in the decision).104 
 
 101. Krieger, supra note 4, at 1186–1211; see also Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and 
Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity 
Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 913 (1999) (arguing for a qualified evidentiary privilege to 
encourage unconscious-bias testing); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 
1129, 1131 (1999) (discussing “unconscious disparate treatment”); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible 
Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299 (1995) (sounding another early 
call for incorporating unconscious discrimination into intentional discrimination standards). 
 102. Krieger, supra note 4, at 1165. 
 103. Id. at 1192–93 (citing Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and 
Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 37–48 (1973)). 
 104. Id. at 1242. 
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Since Krieger’s groundbreaking work, employment law 
scholarship has blossomed with discussions of unconscious racism and 
implicit racial bias.105 Ann McGinley claims that a historical 
interpretation of Title VII’s proof constructs indicates that courts 
should allow evidence of unequal treatment caused by unconscious 
discrimination, but notes that courts have been instead unjustifiably 
tightening their analysis in ways that exclude such evidence.106 Lu-in 
Wang carries forward Krieger’s focus on unconscious racism, arguing 
that institutions are partly to blame for perpetuating a status quo 
fraught with racial bias.107 Tristin Green argues that corporate culture 
itself propagates racism in an unconscious way.108 Melissa Hart 
focuses on how existing Title VII remedies may actually provide 
redress for unconscious racism manifested in employment decisions.109 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes critique Title VII in light 
of the Bertrand and Mullainathan study,110 arguing that constructed 
social meanings of race (such as someone being “regarded as” Black), 
rather than race itself, should be used in legal applications of 
antidiscrimination laws.111 Samuel Bagenstos describes the compelling 
nature of unconscious racism literature and uses it to evaluate a 
 
 105. See, e.g., Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005). 
 106. Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2000). 
 107. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1017–20 (2004). 
 108. See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 628 
(2005) (describing “work culture as a source of discrimination”). 
 109. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 741, 749–50 (2005). 
 110. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 64. For an article that predates and 
contextualizes Professors Bertrand and Mullainathan’s work as well as others’ research in the 
field, see Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329 (1991). Professor Matsuda 
addresses the role of prejudice relating to the way racial minorities speak and casts the 
importance of voice and accent in (and beyond) a Title VII framework. Id. (“Someone who tells 
you they don’t like the way you speak is quite likely telling you that they don’t like you.”). 
While Bertrand and Mullainathan did not test the role of voice and accent in hiring decisions, 
such a study would be worth conducting. For a 2006 article on the changing form of 
discrimination, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An 
Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 365 (2006). 
 111. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (noting that employers often use other criteria as “proxies for race, 
national origin, sex, religion, or age to exclude an applicant as a job contender”). 
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“structural approach” to antidiscrimination law, which he claims 
highlights both the hope and also the challenges of antidiscrimination 
laws.112 
Legal scholarship on unconscious racism and implicit bias has not 
been limited to equal protection and employment discrimination 
discussions. In other areas of law, the prevalence of scholarship 
discussing unconscious racism and implicit racial bias has increased 
greatly.113 Critiquing the Federal Communications Commission’s call 
for more local news, Jerry Kang relies on social cognition research in 
claiming that local news broadcasts can act as a “Trojan Horse,” a 
covert delivery mechanism that propagates the implicit tools of 
racism.114 Kang systematically describes social cognition studies that 
indicate that the simple presence of racial cues can trigger implicit 
racial bias. For example, Kang reviews research on the IAT, details 
studies on shooter bias, and discusses a variety of other studies.115 He 
then demonstrates how these accounts of implicit racial bias are not 
harmless attitudes with little or no connection to real-world effects. 
Instead, they can be directly linked to racially biased behavior, 
interactions, and outcomes.116 Furthermore, echoing Krieger’s prior 
message, Kang’s account provides compelling evidence that people 
frequently have no conscious awareness of their own implicit biases.117 
 
 112. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2006). 
 113. See, e.g., Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit Association Test”: A Measure of 
Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413–15 (2003); 
Andrew Elliot Carpenter, Note, Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay Rule and Racial 
Evaluations of Credibility, 8 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 15, 15 (2002) 
(arguing that unconscious racial bias affects judicial determinations of witness credibility). 
 114. Kang, supra note 3, at 1553–54. 
 115. Id. at 1535. See Kristin A. Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
Test: IV, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz 
eds., 2007) (citing T. Andrew Poehlman et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit 
Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity (Sept. 16, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript at 33), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/IAT.Meta-analysis. 
16Sep05.pdf (finding significant evidence that the IAT connects to real-world effects, such as 
“judgments, behaviors, choices, and physiological reactions”)); id. at 78 (discussing whether the 
IAT connects to real-world behaviors); see also Fazio & Olson, supra note 3, at 297 (discussing 
various priming measures and clarifying “several unresolved theoretical and empirical issues 
concerning implicit measures”); Kang & Banaji, supra note 44 (documenting racial bias in hiring 
behavior and medical diagnoses). 
 116. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1515–17; see also Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 64, at 
991 (linking implicit racial bias to problematic employment decisions). 
 117. Kang, supra note 3, at 1508. 
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In 2006, Kang joined with Mahzarin Banaji to argue for a new 
model of affirmative action that incorporates knowledge from implicit 
social cognition.118 Advancing a new methodology called “behavioral 
realism,”119 Kang and Banaji address the unpersuasive nature of 
traditional debates over affirmative action, pointing out that implicit 
social cognition research opens new avenues for affirmative action 
discourse.120 Demonstrating the many ways that implicit racial bias 
functions automatically and contrary to explicit preferences, they 
propose a system of “fair measures” that harnesses science as part of 
policy development. Taking “fair measures” in response to societal 
implicit biases requires counteracting or avoiding (if and when 
possible) the harmful effects of implicit bias. For example, Kang and 
Banaji argue that “cloaking” social category121 or removing stereotype 
threat triggers122 can help avoid known areas of harm connected to 
bias.123 Kang and Banaji also use evidence of successful bias-reduction 
strategies to call for a new type of fair measure—using “debiasing 
agents.”124 This fair measure harnesses bias reduction studies 
indicating that exposure to minorities in counterstereotypic roles 
(such as authority figures) can temporarily reduce (or at least 
suppress) implicit bias. In practical terms, using a “debiasing agent” 
might include publicizing or hiring counterstereotypic exemplars—
such as “women construction workers, male nurses, Black 
intellectuals, and White janitors.”125 If people recognize and associate 
 
 118. Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1065–67. 
 119. Id. at 1065 (seeking to expose and then remedy gaps between legal assumptions and 
scientific reality); see also Levinson, supra note 91, at 1–3 (empirically evaluating the gap 
between legal standards of “intent” and the psychological reality of the way people perceive 
intentionality). Work by Professors Lawrence, Krieger, and others focusing on unconscious 
motives fits nicely within this “behavioral realist model.” 
 120. Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1068–71. 
 121. Id. at 1093 (“For example, schools can conduct blind grading of student work.”). The 
authors point out that such a step could help ameliorate effects such as those demonstrated by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan’s job resume study. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1096. Stereotype threat describes the harmful effects that can be generated simply 
by “priming” racial or other stereotype-consistent constructs. See, e.g., Steele & Aronson, supra 
note 50, at 797 (having African-American students identify their race before taking a 
standardized test has been shown to lower their standardized test scores). Avoiding racial 
primes in such situations may not fully counteract the effect of stereotypes on test performance, 
but it could reduce it. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1096–98. 
 123. Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1092–94, 1096–98. 
 124. Id. at 1066–67 (proposing new terminology by using a “fair measures” model instead of 
an “affirmative action” model). 
 125. Id. at 1109. 
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these debiasing agents as “anchored to that social category,” related 
biases and stereotypes may become moderated over time.126 
Another example of the growing scholarship on implicit racial 
bias is Antony Page’s critique of the Batson v. Kentucky127 three-step 
procedure for attacking peremptory challenges.128 Presenting a broad 
array of evidence detailing the automaticity of racial and gender 
stereotyping, Page challenges the Batson test in light of social science 
research.129 Supporting Krieger and Kang’s work that points out the 
disconnect between conscious awareness and implicit bias, Page 
argues that because attorneys are not aware of their own thought 
processes, they may not know fully why they exercised a peremptory 
challenge.130 
Focusing on practical solutions to the unconscious racism 
problem, Jody Armour discusses unconscious racism by distinguishing 
between stereotypes and personal beliefs, and proposes using 
egalitarian (conscious) personal beliefs to help overcome the effects 
of unconscious racism on juries.131 Armour argues that the best bias-
combating strategies are not ex post constitutional law inquiries (as 
called for by the intent doctrine), but a practical and scientifically 
grounded bias-reduction strategy targeting legal decisionmakers.132 
Despite Armour’s early call for bias reduction and for future research 
on overcoming bias, social cognition research has not yet provided a 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 128. Page describes the Batson standard: 
In step one, the defendant must raise an inference that the prosecutor used a 
peremptory challenge to exclude the person from the jury on account of her race. In 
step two, the trial court judge, in order to determine whether the peremptory 
challenge was exercised unconstitutionally, asks the prosecutor to supply a race-
neutral reason. If the prosecutor meets this burden, in step three the judge decides 
whether the prosecutor exercised the peremptory challenge with the requisite 
purposeful discrimination. 
Page, supra note 22, at 158 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–98). 
 129. Id. at 220–21 (highlighting the faultiness of human memories when information is 
inconsistent with stereotypes and pointing out that people can also have “‘memory illusions,’ in 
which [people] recall stereotype-confirming behaviors that never actually transpired”) (citing 
Tadesse Araya et al., Remembering Things That Never Occurred: The Effects of To-Be-
Forgotten Stereotypical Information, 50 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 27, 27 (2003)). 
 130. Id. at 160. 
 131. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (1995); see also Kang, supra note 3, at 1508 n.81 
(noting that Armour’s distinction is roughly analogous to the difference between implicit and 
explicit). 
 132. See Armour, supra note 131, at 733–34. 
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universal bias reduction solution. In fact, overcoming implicit biases 
such as those demonstrated by the IAT appears to be quite difficult, 
given that implicit biases are particularly resistant to conscious 
efforts.133 
Scholars have also incorporated knowledge of implicit racial bias 
into political lawyering134 and social justice strategies. Calling for 
practical applications of research on implicit bias, Gary Blasi argues 
that scientific research on the human mind and racial bias should be 
understood and applied by practicing attorneys and public policy 
advocates.135 As Blasi points out, understanding the true implicit 
nature of bias can reshape the nature of effective advocacy. Eric 
Yamamoto also recognizes the importance of understanding 
unconscious racial forces in a public policy advocacy setting.136 
Examining the gap between legal efforts for social justice and 
scholarly pursuits in critical race theory, Yamamoto argues that 
political lawyering must become compatible with emerging 
perspectives on racism and bias, including the complex role of 
unconscious racism in society.137 
Perhaps reflecting successes of the sort advocated by Blasi and 
Yamamoto, judicial decisions have begun to recognize the influence 
of unconscious racial bias.138 For example, in the case of Chin v. 
 
 133. See Kang, supra note 3, at 1562 (noting that although conscious control may not 
counteract implicit attitudes demonstrated by the IAT, consciously altering “informational and 
interaction environment” might help). See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of bias-
reduction strategies. Through the years, scholars have kept Armour’s focus on overcoming bias 
alive. In one such project, Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein suggest that perhaps legal rules 
themselves can offer clues to dealing with biases in the legal setting. See Christine Jolls & Cass 
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006). 
 134. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice 
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 833–34 (1997) (describing political lawyers 
in post–civil rights America as those who have employed law and civil rights “in efforts to 
change government and private institutions”). 
 135. Blasi, supra note 44, at 1245. 
 136. See Yamamoto, supra note 134, at 845 n.17, 847–48 (recognizing the continued power 
of Lawrence’s arguments and drawing on the cultural links to discrimination). 
 137. Id. at 827, 830, 868. 
 138. E.g., Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Cal. 2004). For a discussion of two 
projects involving this case, see Sara R. Benson, Reviving the Disparate Impact Doctrine to 
Combat Unconscious Discrimination: A Study of Chin v. Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 
61 (2005), opining that evidence of severe disparate impact plus unconscious bias should be 
enough for a plaintiff’s victory; and Teshima, supra note 22, at 123, arguing that “court officials 
[in Chin] . . . unconsciously relied upon the stereotype of Asian Americans as unassertive and 
passive.” A more famous mention of unconscious discrimination occurred in Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent in Georgia v. McCollum. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
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Runnels,139 a criminal defendant convicted of murder appealed the 
guilty verdict on habeas corpus grounds, arguing that Chinese 
Americans, Filipino Americans, and Hispanic Americans had been 
excluded from serving as foreperson on the grand jury that indicted 
him.140 Though the court denied the appeal in light of the “narrow 
standard of review applicable,”141 Judge Breyer nonetheless discussed 
the evidence regarding foreperson selection, which led to “a strong 
inference that the selection process may not have been race-
neutral.”142 In the San Francisco jurisdiction in which the defendant 
was tried, no Chinese American, Filipino American, or Latino had 
been chosen to be grand jury foreperson during a thirty-six year 
period, a result that would have amounted to a .0003 percent chance 
if evaluated based on the chances of random selection.143 Breyer 
wrote, “[T]he complete absence of grand jury forepersons of Chinese, 
Filipino, or Latino descent over a 36-year period begs the question 
whether unconscious stereotyping or biases may have contributed to 
the exclusion of these groups notwithstanding the best of intentions of 
those involved.”144 Other prominent juridical references to 
unconscious racism have included references at the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals145 and the Supreme Court.146 
As legal scholarship on implicit bias has grown, empirical studies 
have consistently improved their methodology and continued to 
reveal that Americans possess a variety of racially biased implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes.147 Nonetheless, few projects have 
investigated how racial biases affect the implicit cognitive processes of 
 
dissenting) (“It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white 
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining 
the verdict of guilt or innocence.”). 
 139. Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 140. Id. at 892. 
 141. Id. at 905. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 906. 
 145. See id. (citing EEOC v. Inland Marine, 729 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1984); Gonzalez-Rivera 
v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); Bush 
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F. 2d 928 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 146. See id. (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 147. See, e.g., Nosek et al., supra note 41, at 101 (administering IATs using a Web-based 
interface). The evolution and debate over the IAT’s validity exemplifies the methodological 
challenges that must be overcome in order to have “good science.” These challenges increase 
the quality of subsequent projects. 
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judges and juries.148 This hole in legal discourse heightens the need for 
studies that connect implicit racial bias with the legal decisionmaking 
processes. One area of study in particular that deserves investigation 
is the way which judges and jurors remember (or forget) information 
from trial. Psychological research on memory reveals important clues 
as to how legal decisions are made. 
II.  MISREMEMBERING LEGAL  
FACTS IN RACIALLY STEREOTYPED WAYS 
It should come as no surprise that the human mind does not 
always act like a sponge. In the legal setting, lawmakers, judges, and 
scholars hope but hardly expect that jurors exhibit perfect retention 
of trial facts, particularly in complicated trials.149 Many discussions of 
cognitive bias, for example, detail biases that are intimately 
connected with judge and juror memory.150 Nonetheless, despite the 
 
 148. Most studies on race in the law have focused on how race affects guilty verdicts. These 
studies concentrate more on the outcome than on the process. See e.g., David C. Baldus, Race 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical 
Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 6 passim (2005) 
(discussing sentencing disparities as a result of race). One potential way to overcome this gap in 
research is through cross-disciplinary collaborations. A few examples of recent cross-
disciplinary collaborations include Blasi & Jost, supra note 81, at 1119 (elaborating on the 
implications of System Justification Theory for “law, lawyering, and advocacy for social 
justice”); Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1064 (examining how the “science of implicit social 
cognition” may “transform both lay and expert conceptions of affirmative action”); and Mitchell 
& Tetlock, supra note 79, at 1116 (exposing the “murkiness” surrounding current IAT research 
and urging caution in legal reforms). Some collaborations have tested psychological phenomena 
in legal scenarios. E.g., Levinson & Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences, supra note 99, at 34 
(testing how judgments of property ownership are affected by framing effects and other 
cognitive biases). 
 149. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that jurors’ memories are imperfect); M. Neil Brown et al., The Shared 
Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 460 (2006) 
(questioning juror memories when scientific studies indicate that people can only store 1 
percent of information as long-term memory). For a psychological study assessing juror memory 
retention, see Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Memory Monitoring in Mock Jurors, 5 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 152, 165 (1999), which demonstrates that there is no 
correlation between mock jurors’ predictions about or confidence in their memories and actual 
memory performance. 
 150. Several sources from the late 1990’s and 2000’s discuss the hindsight bias and the 
availability heuristic. E.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the 
Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 588 (1994); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The 
Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715, 724 n.34 (2003); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 
90; Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1277 (1999); Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 571; April M. Perry, Comment: 
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understanding that jurors’ memory capacities are limited and that 
cognitive biases persist, scholars still assume that these cognitive 
limitations are not embedded with racial bias. As Part I 
demonstrated, however, social cognition research on implicit bias has 
shown that people experience difficulty in performing a variety of 
simple cognitive tasks when basic racial constructs are active.151 It 
should not be surprising, then, to learn that when participating in 
cases with racially diverse legal parties, jurors (and perhaps judges) 
may unknowingly misremember trial information in systematically 
biased ways. 
This Part explores research in human memory processes and 
presents theoretical background for my claim that implicit racial bias 
in memory retention of case facts hinders legal decisionmaking 
processes. To provide an overview of the relevant topics in memory, 
it explores a variety of empirical studies on the human memory. 
These studies include examinations of recall errors, false memory 
generation, the interaction between false memories and stereotypes, 
and memory errors known as “source monitoring errors.” The 
discussion then turns from proof of individual memory errors to 
address whether memory errors committed by individuals will affect 
group decisionmaking processes. Taken together, research in memory 
and decisionmaking indicates that memory errors are normal, occur 
in stereotype-driven ways, and can manifest in a variety of ways that 
ultimately affect legal decisionmaking. 
A. Memory Errors Are Normal and Meaningful 
Scholars of memory and cognition have learned a great deal 
about the ways in which the human brain can systematically 
misremember facts.152 According to Daniel Schacter, memory errors 
 
Guilt by Saturation: Media Liability for Third-Party Violence and the Availability Heuristic, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2003). 
 151. Cf. Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 73, at 181 (assessing the effect of implicit gender 
bias on subjects’ perception of certain names as famous). 
 152. See generally MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES 
RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (Daniel Schacter ed., 1995) (examining memory distortion in normal 
adults, children, mentally handicapped patients, and other populations); Alison P. Lenton et al., 
Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 
(2001) (eliciting gender-stereotype-consistent false memories using word lists); C. Neil Macrae 
et al., Creating Memory Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processing and the Generation of False 
Memories, 10 MEMORY 63 (2002) (finding that age and cognitive busyness increase subjects’ 
generation of stereotype-consistent false memories). 
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can be grouped into two broad categories: forgotten information and 
distorted recollections.153 Errors based upon both forgotten 
information and distorted recollections have the potential to 
influence the way juries recall and “mis-recall” the facts of cases. Yet 
few memory errors have been investigated in the context of jury 
decisionmaking.154 Nonetheless, research on human memory 
processes has prospered outside the legal context.155 These studies 
have revealed two major themes: people are generally unaware of 
how their memories work,156 and misremembrances are not random—
they are normal, predictable, and meaningful.157 The first theme 
perhaps illustrates why legal scholars have underutilized memory 
research in decisionmaking discussions (though studies on eyewitness 
identification have incorporated it in detail).158 The second theme and 
its implications illustrate why legal scholars should pay more 
attention to memory research. 
Misremembrances occur outside of conscious awareness. 
According to C. Neil Macrae and his colleagues, people are 
“unwittingly duped into believing that the contents of consciousness 
comprise an accurate record of the experienced past, when in fact 
they do not. Instead, these items are false memories, illusory 
experiences of events, actions, and utterances that never occurred.”159 
But why do false memories arise and what can be learned from them? 
Memory researchers have found that false memories emerge 
regularly in the course of normal cognitive functioning and that they 
 
 153. Schacter calls these error categories the “sin of omission” and the “sin of commission,” 
respectively. DANIEL SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS 
AND REMEMBERS 4–5 (2001). 
 154. For one study conducted in the legal realm, see Jeanine L. Skorinko & Barbara A. 
Spellman, Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime Associations Affect Memory and 
(Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). For further discussion of this study, see infra notes 169–71 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. Significant research on memory processes traces back several decades to an influential 
book, FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1932). 
 156. CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 228 (3d ed. 2004). 
 157. See Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 64 (“[R]esearch reveals that we often 
misremember the past in ways that flatter our egos, confirm our self-theories, and serve our 
currently active needs and motives.”). 
 158. These studies are often led by psychologists rather than lawyers. See infra notes 190–95 
and accompanying text. 
 159. Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 63. 
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are explainable by understanding the intricacies of the human mind.160 
Some memory researchers have posited that people unknowingly 
reconstruct the past in ways that flatter their egos and serve to bolster 
their theories and beliefs about themselves.161 Others, however, have 
documented the emergence of false memories in a broader range of 
situations.162 An investigation of these normal errors reveals that they 
frequently occur because of the human mind’s heavy reliance on 
stereotypes during the encoding and recall of information. 
B. Stereotypes Drive Recall Errors and False Memory Generation 
Both types of memory errors, those based on recall (forgetting) 
and those based on distorted recollections (false memories), emerge 
in situations in which stereotypes are involved.163 With respect to both 
encoding and recall of information, stereotypes facilitate the way the 
brain stores and processes information. Thus, when people attempt to 
recall information that is somewhat hazy in their memories, they 
generally rely on familiarity and expectations to help fill in the 
content of those memories. But familiarity and expectations can be 
code for stereotypes.164 As a result, people often recall stereotype-
consistent information more easily than stereotype-inconsistent 
 
 160. See id. at 65 (describing the cognitive efficiency of expectancy-driven memory). 
 161. Id. at 64 (citing Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision 
of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603 (1980); Leonard S. Newman & Roy F. 
Baumeiser, Toward an Explanation of the UFO Abduction Phenomenon: Hypnotic Elaboration, 
Extraterrestrial Sadomasochism, and Spurious Memories, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 99 (1996); and 
M. Ross, Relation of Implicit Theories to the Construction of Personal Histories, 96 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 341 (1989)). 
 162. See Henry L. Roediger & Kathleen B. McDermott, Creating False Memories: 
Remembering Words That Were Not Presented in Lists, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 803, 804–05 (1995) (eliciting false word recollections in 
purely associative domains such as categories of furniture, as opposed to stereotypical domains 
such as race); Henry L. Roediger & Kathleen B. McDermott, False Alarms About False 
Memories. 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 406, 406, 409 (1999) (following up on the 1995 study with similar 
results). 
 163. Stereotypes can serve important cognitive functions. Page, supra note 22, at 236. 
Nonetheless, the stereotypes I discuss in this Part are harmful stereotypes that relate race to 
undesirable characteristics. 
 164. To clarify this point, it should be noted that stereotypes are the product of repeated 
associations between groups of people and concepts. When African Americans, for example, 
are repeatedly associated with criminality, a stereotype is formed. See Greenwald & Kreiger, 
supra note 3, at 949; see also Skorinko & Spellman, supra note 154, at 2 (“A stereotype is a 
cognitive representation of the ideas, facts and images that are associated with a social group.”). 
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information.165 The link between stereotypes and memory is even 
stronger when looking at memory distortions such as false memories. 
Memory scholars have explained that people are more likely to 
generate false memories when the contents of these memories are 
consistent with stereotypes they have about the subject, actor, and 
situation of the memory.166 The tendency of false memories and 
 
 165. Page, supra note 22, at 220. In cases, however, where people place more cognitive 
energy into the encoding phase, stereotype-inconsistent information can be recalled more easily 
than stereotype-consistent information. Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 65 (citing William A. 
Johnston & Kevin J. Hawley, Perceptual Inhibition of Expected Inputs: The Key That Opens 
Closed Minds, 1 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 56 (1994)). When people perceive events, if the 
information they perceive deviates sufficiently from their expectations, they may actually 
encode it better than they will encode stereotype-consistent information. Thus, although people 
easily recall (and generate false memories of) stereotype-consistent information, they can 
accurately recall stereotype-inconsistent information if they took extra cognitive effort to 
encode it initially. See Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 68, 70 (finding that, in the gender-
employment context, participants were more likely to correctly remember names that had been 
paired with stereotype-inconsistent occupations); K. Rojahn & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Memory 
for Schema-Relevant Information: A Meta-Analytic Resolution, 31 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 81, 
84, 99 (1992) (asserting that stereotype-inconsistent information is “generally well encoded and 
well remembered” but describing conditions under which it is not); Charles Stangor & David 
McMillan, Memory for Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-Incongruent Information: A 
Review of the Social and Social Developmental Literatures, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 42, 55 (1992) 
(finding that stereotype-inconsistent information is recalled more accurately under certain 
conditions). But see J. Fyock & Charles Stangor, The Role of Memory Biases in Stereotype 
Maintenance, 33 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335–36, 339 (1994) (conducting a meta-analysis 
and concluding that stereotype-consistent information is remembered slightly better than 
stereotype-inconsistent information). 
This distinction should not be too troubling. Here is an example: Imagine going to a 
baseball game. At different times during the game, the players are playing with different colors 
of baseballs: white baseballs and blue baseballs. Later, a fan who was in attendance is asked 
what color baseballs the players used. The fan might first recall the blue baseballs—they 
deviated enough from expectancy so that it was encoded more deeply within the fan’s memory. 
But the fan will also easily recall the white baseballs. For the white balls, the fan stored the 
memory loosely because it matched the mental expectancy. See Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 
65. Overall then, although stereotypes would facilitate the fan’s memory of the white baseballs 
because the fan would not expend the extra cognitive energy to encode it perfectly, the blue 
baseballs would be unique enough to generate a deeper level of memory storage. 
The analogy to baseball, however, is inapt when considering memories of criminal legal 
stories. Although people may harbor race-based expectancies for certain crimes (e.g. violent 
crimes-Black perpetrator), a White person’s commission of a violent crime should not be as 
cognitively surprising as seeing a blue baseball at a game. Thus, although people can sometimes 
remember stereotype-inconsistent information more accurately (the blue baseball v. the white 
baseball), they will probably revert more easily to memory stereotypes when attempting to 
recall less-surprising occurrences (the White violent criminal v. the Black violent criminal). The 
results of the empirical study discussed in Part III support this explanation. 
 166. See Skorinko & Spellman, supra note 154, at 7; see also Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 
64 (“[R]esearch reveals that we often misremember the past in ways that flatter our egos, 
confirm our self-theories, and serve our currently active needs and motives.”). 
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stereotypes to go hand in hand emerges because people tend to 
misremember things that are loosely stored in the brain.167 Stereotype-
consistent information is stored in broad schemas rather than deeply 
encoded in the human memory.168 When people recall certain 
information that is part of a web of existing schemas and stereotypes, 
they may erroneously (and unknowingly) create additional memories 
of things that never happened that are consistent with those 
stereotypes. 
Studies show how stereotypes are implicated both in memory 
recall and in memory distortion. A study by Jeanine Skorinko and 
Barbara Spellman on memory recall demonstrates how racial 
stereotypes influence people’s memories of crimes.169 One portion of 
the study presented participants with scenarios of two stereotypically 
white crimes (ecstasy usage and identity fraud), two stereotypically 
black crimes (crack cocaine usage and shoplifting), and two 
stereotypically neutral crimes (marijuana usage and joyriding).170 The 
race of the crime perpetrator in the stories was varied. After reading 
the stories, the experimenters asked participants to recall crime 
information by matching the race of the perpetrator with the crime. 
Results indicated that participants were more likely to recall the race 
of the defendant, black or white, when the crime matched the racial 
stereotypes of that defendant. For example, for identity fraud, 
participants were more likely to recall the race of a Caucasian 
perpetrator than an African-American perpetrator.171 The study 
shows that racial stereotypes can systematically affect jurors’ 
(implicit) recollections in the legal setting, and that jurors may exhibit 
better recall of information about stereotypical criminals and crimes. 
Skorinko and Spellman’s study indicates that stereotype 
consistency can influence accuracy of recall. A study by Alison 
 
 167. See Lenton et al., supra note 152, at 4 (describing how subjects may falsely remember 
reading a word if it reflects the “gist” of a word list to which they were actually exposed). 
 168. Id. at 5. 
 169. See Skorinko & Spellman, supra note 154, at 2; see also Lenton et al., supra note 152, at 
3. 
 170. Skorinko & Spellman, supra note 154, at 19, 46 app. B. The researchers pretested race-
crime stereotypes to confirm the racial stereotype categorization. Id. at 10–19. 
 171. Id. at 24. This result indicates that racial minorities are not always on the short end of 
the memory stick because the biased connection is not directly between race and memory, but 
instead between crime-stereotype and memory. Nonetheless, because of the stereotypical 
connection between minorities and crime (and because violent crimes are stereotypical of 
African Americans), one might expect memory stereotype biases to affect African Americans 
and other minority groups more frequently than Caucasians. 
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Lenton and her colleagues expands the influence of stereotypes to 
include false memories.172 They presented participants with a list of 
words,173 some of which were stereotypic of women (such as secretary 
and nurse) and others of which were stereotypic of men (such as 
lawyer and soldier). After participants completed a distraction task, 
they were given a recognition test.174 Results showed that participants 
used gender stereotypes in creating false memories. That is, they 
more often (incorrectly) reported that they had seen gender-
stereotyped words than non-gender-stereotyped words.175 Results also 
indicated that these false memories were elicited implicitly. Despite 
the nature of their errors, most participants were completely unaware 
of the gender stereotype theme of the word lists.176 The researchers 
expressed concern that the implicit creation of stereotype-consistent 
false memories may help to explain the “self-perpetuating nature of 
stereotypes and their resistance to change.”177 
Studies on the influence of “cognitive busyness” on stereotypes 
and false memories indicate that people generate even more false 
memories when they are under stress, distracted, older, or otherwise 
cognitively busy.178 Recognizing that previous memory studies on 
 
 172. See Lenton et al., supra note 152, at 5; see also Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 68 
(corroborating Lenton’s results for false memory generation). 
 173. All participants were shown sixty words that constituted gender-neutral roles and 
fifteen words that were gender stereotyped. Of these fifteen words, half of the participants 
received female stereotype roles and half received male stereotype roles. To obfuscate the 
gender context, the list of gender-specific stereotype roles was surrounded by the other sixty 
words. Lenton et al., supra note 152 at 5–6. 
 174. Id. at 6. 
 175. Id. at 7. 
 176. Id. The researchers considered the low awareness level to support a theory of implicit 
activation of stereotype-consistent information. Id. at 10. 
 177. Id. at 12. This “self-perpetuating nature of stereotypes” may function in the legal 
setting as well. If an implicit memory bias or other stereotype-driven bias ultimately leads to 
more criminal convictions of a stereotyped group, conviction statistics could act to reinforce 
stereotypes. This, in turn, could lead to more stereotype-driven errors (and additional 
convictions). 
 178. Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 72, 76–77. Stress, fatigue, and divided attention all 
impair a person’s recall ability. Even the aging process can lead to more false memories. As 
people age, their frontal lobe brain function decreases, and they become more likely to rely 
heavily on schemas at the expense of more detailed encoding processes. Id. at 72. This schema 
reliance translates into stereotype-consistent false memories. Older adults will thus generate 
more stereotype-consistent false memories than younger adults. Age effects increase in severity 
along with time-delay effects (delays between the intake of information and the recall of that 
information), another type of executive dysfunction. See id. (citing Wilma Koutstaal & Daniel 
L. Schacter, Gist-Based False Recognition of Pictures in Older and Younger Adults, 37 J. 
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 555 (1997)). Many researchers link age differences in false memories 
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stereotype consistency and false memory had used study participants 
whose cognitive energy was exclusively on the task at hand, Professor 
Macrae and his colleagues ran a study to test how attention depletion 
affects false memories and stereotype consistency. They employed a 
gender-occupation methodology that resembled Lenton and her 
colleagues’ word pair study.179 This study, however, tested both older 
and younger adults and gave half of the younger adult participants a 
simultaneous task to complete while they viewed the pairings of 
names and occupations.180 The purpose of the simultaneous task 
(which consisted of counting backwards by three’s from two 
thousand) was to split the participants’ attention between the 
memory task and the counting task. Thus, the experimenters could 
test how decreased attention affects false memories and stereotypes.181 
As expected, the results indicated that attention-depleted participants 
were less accurate in their memories than full-attention participants.182 
In addition, the results showed that both attention-depleted young 
adults and full-attention older adults committed more stereotype-
consistent memory errors than full-attention young adults did.183 
In the legal context, this study’s results are troubling. Rarely are 
judges and jurors focusing on one piece of information at a time. Age, 
multiple jury instructions, detailed factual presentations, new and 
more complex legal standards,184 and conflicting testimony are all 
 
to frontal lobe brain function. Id. Although older people typically experience more memory 
errors than younger people, some younger people, such as those with poor reading 
comprehension skills, have a propensity for false memories. Id. at 77 (citing Rossana De Beni et 
al., Increases in Intrusion Errors and Working Memory Deficit of Poor Comprehenders, 51 Q. J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 305 (1998)). 
 179. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
 180. Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 72–73. None of the older adults were subjected to 
attention depletion. Researchers only depleted the attention of a group of younger adults 
because they theorized that attention-depleted young adults make similar stereotype-consistent 
false errors to older adults giving full attention. Id. at 72. 
 181. Legal commentators can analogize attention depletion to the concept of cognitive 
overload in juries. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision-Making 
after the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 335–36 (discussing cognitive overload and 
other cognitive challenges in the context of increased juror responsibilities after Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). 
 182. Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 73. 
 183. Id. at 73–74. In discussing the implications of their research findings on false memories 
and stereotype consistency, Macrae and his colleagues surmised that “the creation of false 
memories may provide yet another avenue through which perceivers can bolster their pre-
existing beliefs about the world,” an implication they found “sobering.” Id. at 75. 
 184. See, e.g., Prescott & Starr, supra note 181, at 335–36 (foreseeing the complex task that 
juries may face). 
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likely to add to cognitive depletion. As a result, one can expect a 
significant amount of stereotype-consistent memory errors to 
manifest in the legal setting. 
C. Legal Memories Gone Wrong: Source Attribution Errors 
False memories are normal and can propagate stereotypes. But 
what types of false memories are likely to emerge in legal 
decisionmaking? One particular type of error, called source 
attribution error, may help explain how systematic memory bias may 
be implicated in legal decisionmaking. Although this memory error 
has sometimes been applied to eyewitness memory faults,185 it has not 
been discussed in the context of juror memory errors and implicit 
racial bias. 
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman conducted an early and 
influential study that illustrated a source attribution error using a 
version of the telephone game.186 In the study (which was not 
originally intended to be a memory study but a study about rumors), 
participants viewed a picture of passengers on a streetcar (one of 
whom was Black). In the picture, one White passenger holds a razor 
blade and the Black passenger is empty-handed. After viewing the 
picture, participants were then asked to describe the picture to other 
participants who had not seen the picture. As participants told and 
retold the story to others, the story changed. After the story had been 
retold several times, some participants reported that the Black 
passenger—not the White passenger—held a razor blade.187 The 
results of the study (which had originally focused on retelling 
accuracy) demonstrated a source attribution error—the razor blade 
possession shifted from one memory source (the White passenger) to 
another (the Black passenger). Was it a coincidence that the source 
attribution error reflected stereotype consistency? Quite unlikely. 
Rather, the study more likely stands for the proposition that 
stereotypes may trigger source attribution errors.188 
 
 185. See infra notes 190–95 for a brief discussion of studies investigating eyewitness 
memory. 
 186. GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO J. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 65–68 
(Russell & Russell 1965) (1947). 
 187. Id. at 70–72 & fig.7. 
 188. Skorinko & Spellman, supra note 154, at 6. A study by Richard Marsh and his 
colleagues supports this proposition. Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation 
Stereotypes Bias Source-Monitoring Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 157–58 (2006) (finding that 
participants attributed sources of memory in a manner consistent with gender and sexual 
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Source attribution errors occur when a person places the source 
of one memory into another setting, creating an incorrect source of 
another memory.189 In the context of eyewitness identification, the 
concerns created by source attribution errors are powerful and easy 
to conceptualize.190 A victim of a crime or an eyewitness might 
unknowingly transfer the memory of a person or face into another 
context.191 Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, for 
example,192 a massive search commenced for John Doe No. 2,193 “a 
 
orientation stereotypes). For a study examining how the retelling of stories increases memory 
errors that are consistent with stereotypes, see Yoshihisa Kashima, Maintaining Cultural 
Stereotypes in the Serial Reproduction of Narratives, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
594, 594 (2000). 
 189. SCHACTER, supra note 153, at 8. 
 190. See id. at 92 (discussing the “chilling” statistics regarding mistaken eyewitness 
identification); see also Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of “Unconscious Transference”: 
The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. 
REV. 107, 123–24, 142 (1996) (exploring source attribution errors’ implications for the 
admissibility of evidence despite some lack of clarity in the field). For a comprehensive 
discussion of memory issues in eyewitness identification, see Ralph Norman Haber & Lyn 
Haber, Experiencing, Remembering, and Reporting Events, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1057 
(2000). In addition to studies on source attribution errors, studies on memory in eyewitness 
testimony have also connected memory errors to racial bias. These studies indicate that memory 
errors may occur, particularly when perpetrators are out-group members. The “own-race bias,” 
for example, demonstrates that people can discriminate better between faces of their own ethnic 
group than faces of other ethnic groups. BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 156, at 253. For a 
discussion of own-race bias in the context of legal rules, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial 
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 986 (1984). Research has 
repeatedly found that White participants are more accurate in identifying White faces than 
Black faces. Id. at 936, 938–39. A meta-analysis of thirty years of studies on own-race bias, 
however, confirmed that racial attitudes do not serve as predictors of own-race bias. Christian 
A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for 
Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 7 (2001) (analyzing data from 
thirty-nine separate studies on own-race bias). That these studies have not found a connection 
between explicit racial attitudes and memory of out-group races indicates that own-race bias 
operates implicitly. When considered in the jury context, these studies suggest not only that 
juror memory may be subject to implicit memory biases, but also that such biases cannot be 
predicted by identifying explicitly biased jurors. Another widely discussed issue in the study of 
eyewitness memory is the role of repression, including the reemergence of repressed memories 
through the use of hypnosis. See, e.g., JENNIFER J. FREYD, BETRAYAL TRAUMA: THE LOGIC OF 
FORGETTING CHILDHOOD ABUSE 1–11, 197 (1996) (setting out a “betrayal trauma theory” to 
account for victims’ repression of memories of abuse); Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of 
Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 518, 518 (1993) (providing a history of the evidence for 
and against the existence of repression and some of its legal and social repercussions). 
 191. These types of errors are well documented and have been discussed in terms of 
evidentiary laws. See Gilligan et al., supra note 190 (examining the implications of unconscious 
transference for rape shield laws). 
 192. This example was given by SCHACTER, supra note 153, at 91–92. 
 193. Timothy McVeigh was John Doe No. 1. Id. 
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young square-faced man with dark hair and a stocky build wearing a 
blue and white cap.”194 John Doe No. 2’s description came from a 
mechanic who had seen Timothy McVeigh rent a van before the 
bombing. After a massive search, it turned out that there was no John 
Doe No. 2. The mechanic had simply confused another van rental 
transaction with McVeigh’s rental. The other rental transaction had 
involved two men, one of whom resembled McVeigh. The second 
man was a stocky square-faced man. The mechanic had unconsciously 
transferred memory of John Doe No. 2 from one context to the 
other.195 
If source attribution errors can cause faulty eyewitness 
identifications, they can also cause jurors to falsely recall case facts by 
attributing evidentiary facts to the wrong party without recognizing it 
(as illustrated by Allport and Postman’s study).196 Recall The 
Confrontation story from the beginning of this Article. In attempting 
to remember the story, some readers might have believed that 
Tyronne kicked James. Such an error would constitute a source 
attribution error because Tyronne’s friend kicked James, not 
Tyronne. Memory researchers have pointed out that, as demonstrated 
by Allport and Postman’s results, source attribution errors can 
systematically occur in ways driven by stereotypes. Using an analogy 
from West Side Story, Jeffrey Sherman and his colleagues noted that 
“[s]tereotype-driven errors in source memory may lead you to falsely 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 92. According to Schacter, the source of the mechanic’s memory error was 
“unconscious transference.” Id. Francis Gilligan and colleagues clarify that unconscious 
transference is closely related to source attribution errors, which they claim is the more accurate 
psychological terminology. See Gilligan et al., supra note 190, at 116. For purposes of this 
Article, to avoid confusion in terminology, I use source attribution error and unconscious 
transference interchangeably. According to Elizabeth Loftus, source attribution errors result 
from the malleable nature of human memory and allow eyewitnesses to confidently conclude 
that the wrong person committed a crime. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 46–47 (1987). Unconscious transference is a 
well-documented phenomenon. According to Bartol and Bartol, two surveys indicate that 
between 81 and 84.5 percent of psychologists believe that evidence of unconscious transference 
is reliable enough to be presented in court. BARTOL & BARTOL, supra note 156, at 252 (citing 
Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New 
Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001); Saul M. Kassin et al., The “General 
Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 
AM. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989)). 
 196. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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remember that the Sharks rather than the Jets committed 
homicide . . . .”197 
D. Connecting Memories to Decisionmaking 
If implicit biases affect judge and juror memories of case facts, do 
these biases also affect legal outcomes?198 Making such a connection 
requires linking the cognitive process of memory to decisionmaking 
itself. Put simply, if biased memories do not create biased outcomes, 
this concern should be moderated. Yet, no empirical studies have 
tested the effects of implicitly biased memories on legal 
decisionmaking outcomes. Inside and outside the legal setting, 
however, researchers have documented the crucial role memories 
play in decisionmaking.199 It is quite likely that biased memory 
processes result in biased legal decisions. 
Cognitive psychological research has demonstrated the 
importance of factual memory and recall to a variety of 
decisionmaking models. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie 
developed a “Story Model” of jury decisionmaking,200 a well-regarded 
framework of jury information processing and decisionmaking that 
focuses on understanding how jurors process information.201 
 
 197. Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Bearing False Witness under Pressure: Implicit and Explicit 
Components of Stereotype-Driven Memory Distortions, 21 SOC. COGNITION 213, 243 (2003). 
The researchers point out the legal dangers of such source transference, focusing on faulty 
eyewitness identification. 
 198. This question resembles an early challenge to implicit social cognition work. The 
challenge questioned the connection between implicit attitudes and behavior. That is, do people 
with implicit biases act on them? Evidence has indicated that implicit bias does lead to action. 
See Kang, supra note 3, at 1514–28. 
 199. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research on 
Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90, 95 (1990) 
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research]; see also 
Michael R.P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision Making, in 
EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 125, 156 (Sandra L. 
Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) (noting that previous models often fail to account for a 
variety of empirical findings linking memory to various facets of decisionmaking); Nancy 
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure 
on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521, 521–
31 (1988) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making]. 
 200. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). 
 201. See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121, 1138 (2001) (calling Pennington and Hastie’s theory a “widely accepted” model of 
jury decisionmaking). See generally Reid Hastie, The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 
32 MICH. J. L. REFORM 227 (1999) (reviewing “psychological theories of juror decision 
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According to Pennington and Hastie, the first step for jurors in 
information processing is constructing an “explanatory model” (or 
story) of case facts.202 During the next step, jurors attempt to 
memorize and understand the judicial instructions regarding verdict 
categories.203 Finally, they attempt to fit their “story” into the judicial 
instructions.204 Because of the prominent role of story formation in 
this decisionmaking model, if memory errors taint the content of the 
story when it is formed or recalled, they will likely be preserved. 
These errors will remain in the stories as jurors incorporate the 
stories into the judicial instructions and ultimately make decisions.205 
Research outside of the legal field supports the argument that 
memory functioning is crucial to decisionmaking. Focusing on models 
in the decision sciences (sometimes called “human judgment and 
decisionmaking”), Elke Weber and her colleagues argue that memory 
insights, particularly those related to the encoding process of 
information into memory, are crucial to judgment and 
decisionmaking models.206 Highlighting the importance of a memory-
focused inquiry into decisionmaking, Weber and her colleagues 
propose that “memory can be used the way physicists use cloud 
chambers: to study otherwise unobservable events via the residue 
they leave behind.”207 
Another decisionmaking model that highlights the importance of 
memory is one developed by Michael Dougherty and his colleagues.208 
 
making”); Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-
Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 
(2003) (confirming, critiquing, and expanding Pennington & Hastie’s model). 
 202. Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research, supra note 199, 
at 90–95. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 1007 
(2001) (claiming that juror emotional processes can influence memories and thus stories that 
jurors construct). 
 206. Elke U. Weber et al., And Let Us Not Forget Memory: The Role of Memory Processes 
and Techniques in the Study of Judgment and Choice, in DECISION MAKING FROM A 
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 33, 35 (J. Busemeyer et al. eds., 1995) (citing concern in the judgment 
and decisionmaking field that the focus of the field may be too narrow). Weber and her 
colleagues point out that Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory includes an “editing phase” 
that was based upon memory and coding operations. Id. at 36. 
 207. Id. at 36–37. In this vein, this Article examines memories for racial residue in the legal 
context. 
 208. Michael R.P. Dougherty et al., Memory as a Fundamental Heuristic for Decision 
Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 125, 156 
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The first two stages of this three-stage model illustrate that memory 
encoding and retrieval errors may fundamentally alter legal 
decisionmaking.209 The first stage, called the “representational 
properties” stage, focuses on two complementary ways in which 
people store memories. According to “instance-based theories,” the 
brain encodes and separately stores individual memories as specific 
memory traces.210 According to “abstraction-based theories,” the 
brain stores summaries of stimuli or events such that only 
“important” information is encoded (smaller details are lost).211 
According to Dougherty and his colleagues, both types of 
representations are important for understanding and predicting how 
people will ultimately make decisions. Poor encoding quality on 
instance-based representations, for example, can have major effects 
on later judgments by leading people to underestimate the frequency 
of stimuli or to miscalculate probability judgments.212 Problems in 
abstraction-based representations, including cognitive errors such as 
framing effects, similarly can lead to decisionmaking problems.213 
 
(Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) (noting that previous models often fail to 
account for a variety of empirical findings linking memory to various facets of decisionmaking). 
For another model of decisionmaking that highlights the inclusion of memory, see Valerie F. 
Reyna et al., Memory, Development, and Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Judgment and 
Decision-Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 201, 
201–39 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003). For an argument that 
decisionmaking studies focus on memory as a component of interrelated cognitive processes, 
see Elke U. Weber et al., Beyond Strategies: Implications of Memory Representation and 
Memory Processes for Models of Judgments and Decision Making, in RELATING THEORY AND 
DATA: ESSAYS ON HUMAN MEMORY IN HONOR OF BENNET B. MURDOCK 75, 75–94 (William 
E. Hockley & Stephan Lewandowski eds., 1991). 
 209. Dougherty et al., supra note 208, at 126–29. Dougherty and his colleagues argue that all 
three stages connect memory to decisionmaking. For purposes of this Article, I only focus on 
the first two. One could, however, connect the experiential stage to legal decisionmaking, 
particularly when examining the role of memories in judges’ decisions. 
 210. Id. at 131. 
 211. Id. This type of representational property resembles Pennington and Hastie’s story-
based model. 
 212. Id. at 133. 
 213. Id. at 136 (citing Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making, supra note 
199); see also id. at 137 (“For example, Reyna and Brainerd . . . argued that framing effects are 
not due to the processing of numerical information . . . but are attributable to qualitative 
processing. . . .”). Various legal scholars have focused on the legal impact of framing effects. See, 
e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
163, 167 (2000); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain 
and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1345–46 (1995); Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax 
Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the 
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 798 (2005). These scholars, 
however, generally overlook the role of abstraction-based memory processes in framing effects. 
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The second stage, called the “retrieval from memory” stage, 
focuses on how people recall information.214 According to Dougherty 
and his colleagues, simple biases and errors in memory retrieval can 
ultimately affect decisionmaking. For example, memory retrieval can 
be compromised by ordering effects such as the primacy effect, which 
describes people’s tendency to remember things that are presented 
first in a sequence.215 Because it skews the recall accessibility of items 
presented in a certain order, such a basic memory error will 
ultimately lead to altered decisionmaking. Thus, at each of the first 
two stages of the model developed by Dougherty and his colleagues, 
memory errors can have a systematic effect on decisionmaking. 
In light of the compelling research linking memory to 
decisionmaking, the connection between implicit memory biases and 
legal decisionmaking processes becomes even more intimate. If 
implicit memory biases affect judge or juror encoding or retrieval of 
information, such effects are likely to carry through to legal 
decisionmaking. 
E. Can Deliberations Cure Memory Errors? 
The research discussed in Section D indicates that memory plays 
an integral role in human decisionmaking processes. Nonetheless, 
most of the studies have focused on individual decisionmaking. 
Though judges (except those who sit on panels or who work with 
clerks in a particularly collaborative manner) often engage in 
individual decisionmaking, juries make decisions as groups. Thus, 
before concluding that individual memory biases affect legal 
outcomes, one must first look at research on the relationship between 
individual and group decisionmaking.216 Such scholarship indicates 
 
 214. Dougherty et al., supra note 208, at 139–40. The third stage of the model is called 
“experience and domain knowledge.” Id. 
 215. Id. at 140–41. One early example of primary effect was demonstrated by research on 
people’s impressions of others. This research showed that people develop more positive 
impressions of others when they learn positive information about those people before negative 
information. When they learn negative information first, more negative impressions follow, 
even when the total mix of information is the same. Id. at 141 (citing N.H. Anderson & S. 
Hubert, Effects of Concomitant Verbal Recall on Order Effects in Personality Impression 
Formation, 2 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 379 (1963)). 
 216. A variety of studies have investigated whether racial discrimination occurs in legal 
verdicts. Most of these studies focus on the outcome of the legal question, whether a criminal 
defendant is guilty or not guilty, but do not focus on bias in the decisionmaking process. Samuel 
Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth quantitatively evaluated the scholarship on race and legal 
decisionmaking. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know 
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that group decisionmaking processes typically do not alter already 
completed individual decisionmaking. As a result, memory errors 
made by individual jurors are preserved rather than corrected.217 
Pennington and Hastie’s “Story Model” of decisionmaking helps 
evaluate whether jury deliberations are likely to correct memory 
biases.218 This model has identified two styles of juries, those that are 
“evidence-driven” and those that are “verdict-driven.”219 One style of 
jury has an opportunity to correct memory errors, whereas the other 
does not. According to Pennington and Hastie, “evidence-driven” 
juries first come to agreement about the story to reconcile different 
juror stories about what happened.220 Juries that engage in this type of 
decisionmaking process might have the cognitive opportunity to 
correct memory errors. “Verdict-driven” juries, on the other hand, 
skip the early story stages and move ahead to the verdict stage. In 
doing so, they likely preserve individual juror’s stories of the 
evidence, thus solidifying memory errors that have been incorporated 
into their stories. Overall, then, Pennington and Hastie’s model 
indicates that some juries have an opportunity to correct memory 
errors, but others do not. 
Research by Mary Pritchard and Janice Keenan indicates that 
jury deliberation often fails to correct memory errors, casting doubt 
upon whether even “evidence-driven” juries take advantage of the 
opportunity to improve memories during the story reconciliation 
 
About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
997, 1021 (2003). Their study indicated that existing studies on jury decisionmaking and race 
reveal “less . . . than meets the eye.” Id. at 1029. Some studies, however, reveal outcome 
differences based on race. See Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: 
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 129 (1993); Tara L. 
Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 633 (2005) (finding small but significant 
differences in race effects on verdicts). Studies outside of the legal context reveal a complex 
relationship between decisionmaking in racial contexts and the nonracial explanations given by 
decisionmakers. See Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of 
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 52 
(2006). 
 217. In some cases, jury deliberations may aggravate, rather than ameliorate, biases. See 
Prescott & Starr, supra note 181. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical 
Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2005) (discussing a 
variety of problems that arise in group deliberative processes). 
 218. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 219. Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research, supra note 199, 
at 99. 
 220. Id.; see also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 163–65 (1983) (describing the 
decisionmaking process of “evidence-based” juries). 
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stage. Interested in how successful the jury deliberation process is in 
correcting false memories of individual jurors, Pritchard and Keenan 
examined whether deliberations worked to reduce or eliminate 
memory errors.221 They measured how event memories were initially 
formed and how these event memories changed during the course of 
deliberations. Results indicated that deliberation only slightly 
improved memory errors (even though participants only accurately 
remembered 60 percent of the information tested)222 and that the most 
vocal and dominant jurors were not always the ones with the most 
accurate memories.223 They also found that those jurors who were 
more likely to change their verdict were jurors with less confidence in 
their memories, but not necessarily those with the least accurate 
memories.224 The researchers concluded that the legal system’s 
assumption that deliberation improves memory “is only weakly 
supported.”225 Another study by Pritchard and Keenan indicates that 
individual jurors are not able to catch or correct their own memory 
errors.226 In that study, Pritchard and Keenan tested mock juror 
memory accuracy as well as confidence in the accuracy of their 
memories.227 Results indicated that jurors who were the most 
confident in their memories were not necessarily the most accurate.228 
These studies indicate that if individual juror memories are tarnished 
by racially biased recall errors and false memories, then neither self-
monitoring nor jury deliberation will significantly improve the 
problem. 
Taken as a whole, research on human memory processes 
indicates that people systematically and implicitly make stereotype-
 
 221. Pritchard & Keenan, supra note 8, at 590. 
 222. Id. at 600. This 60 percent may be significantly higher than in real trials. As Pritchard 
and Keenan point out, the trial they used in the study lasted only thirty-five minutes and 
participants were college students (“who tend to have better memories than the typical jury 
pool”). Id. 
 223. Id. at 595, 600. 
 224. Id. at 600. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Pritchard & Keenan, supra note 149, at 165. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 161. Participants, however, were fairly accurate in their ex post assessments of 
their memories. These results mirror one of the major flaws encountered in eyewitness 
testimony—that jurors erroneously assume that confident eyewitnesses are the most accurate 
ones. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 
361 (1998). 
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driven memory errors. It also indicates that these errors are likely to 
affect decisionmaking and that the nature of group deliberations is 
unlikely to help. 
III.  FORGOTTEN EQUALITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
To test whether implicit racial bias manifests in the accuracy of 
juror memories, I employed an empirical study designed to examine 
whether people’s recollections of legal stories are shaped by the race 
of the actors in the stories. The test revealed a variety of systematic 
and implicitly biased memory errors. This Part presents the 
methodology and results of the study. 
A. Methods 
1. Participants.  The study involved 153 undergraduate students 
in a psychology course at the University of Hawai‘i who participated 
in the study for course credit.229 The average age of the participants 
was 21.75 years. Of the participants, 71.2 percent were women. Unlike 
some studies that test only members of the Caucasian community 
compared to members of a minority population, participants in the 
study came from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Thirty 
participants identified themselves as Japanese American,230 twenty-
nine participants identified themselves as Caucasian, three 
participants identified themselves as Hawaiian, and no participants 
identified themselves as African American. Seventy-two participants 
identified themselves as being from mixed ethnic backgrounds.231 Six 
 
 229. Prior to conducting data analysis, data from international student participants were 
excluded from the data set. These participants (those who had lived overseas for four or more 
years) were excluded from the data set because implicit memory biases likely rely on culture-
specific stereotypes. After these participants were excluded from the data set, 153 participants 
remained in the data pool. 
 230. This number (as well as the number of participants in the Caucasian, Hawaiian, and 
African-American groups listed) does not include participants who identified themselves as 
having multiple ethnicities, even if one of those ethnicities was Japanese (or, in the relevant 
cases, Caucasian, Hawaiian, or African American). Participants who indicated more than one 
ethnic background are listed separately in the text. 
 231. These participants indicated each of their ethnic identities, but these combinations are 
too numerous to list here and in some cases identification could compromise the anonymity of 
the survey instrument. 
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participants identified themselves as members of other ethnic 
groups.232 
2. Materials.  Participants read two unrelated stories. One story 
described the circumstances surrounding a fistfight (a story I called 
The Confrontation),233 and the other detailed circumstances 
surrounding an employee who was terminated. After reading the 
stories, participants returned the stories to an experimenter and 
received a questionnaire that contained a brief “distraction task.” The 
distraction task was designed to take approximately five to ten 
minutes and was composed primarily of word completion questions 
and analytical reasoning questions. The goal of the distraction task, as 
is common in memory recall studies, was to eliminate immediate 
memory effects (those that would only linger a few minutes). After 
completing the distraction task, participants were asked to answer 
questions about the stories they read. The stories were as follows. 
Story 1. 
William,234 a 23 year old Caucasian man, first encountered James, a 30 
year old plumber, when they accidentally bumped elbows in a 
crowded bar. In the accident, James spilled beer onto William’s shirt 
and shorts. William was angry but the encounter ended when a bar 
employee took him by the arm and led him away. As William walked 
away with the bar employee, James smiled at William and chuckled. 
An hour after leaving the bar, William and a friend spotted James 
outside a local diner. They approached James slowly, and William 
said: “Why did you bump into me back there?” James said nothing 
and just looked down. William and his friend moved closer to James 
and William repeated his question. James said: “Hey listen . . .it 
 
 232. These were groups that were not listed on the checklist the survey instrument provided. 
Some of the participants who were in this category separately indicated their ethnic identity on 
a line next to the check mark, including participants who checked one or more of the listed 
ethnicities in addition to marking “other.” The groups identified by those who marked “other” 
included Koreans, Samoans, Vietnamese, North Africans, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and 
others. 
 233. The story name or even the existence of a story name, of course, was not part of 
information given to participants. 
 234. As will be described infra text accompanying notes 238–39, only participants randomly 
assigned to the Caucasian “experimental condition” read about William, a Caucasian. 
Participants randomly assigned to the African-American experimental condition read about 
Tyronne, an African American, and participants randomly assigned to the Hawaiian 
experimental condition read about Kawika, a Hawaiian. This type of experimental design is 
known as a “between subjects design.” 
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sounds like you had too much to drink. . .you don’t handle your 
liquor too well. Let it go.” William and his friend looked at each other 
and started laughing. William’s friend took a step towards James and 
said: “What if we won’t let it go?” When he took another step towards 
James, James moved forward, shoved him with both hands, and said: 
“Get out of my face.” Without hesitating, William then stepped 
forward and tried to shove James in the chest, but missed and hit him 
in the face. James fell back slightly. He then turned around, took a 
couple steps away from William, and appeared to reach for something 
in his pocket. William quickly pursued James from behind and 
punched him in the side of the head. James fell to the ground. 
William’s friend stepped forward and kicked James. William and his 
friend then walked away quickly and quietly. 
Story 2. 
Brenda,235 a 28 year old Caucasian woman, worked as a “purchasing 
clerk” in the corporate offices of Big Burger Company, a small chain 
of hamburger joints. Brenda represented the second generation of her 
family to work at the offices of Big Burger Company. In fact, her 
father was once employee of the month at the company. Brenda’s job 
required that she work five days a week for eight hours a day. She was 
permitted one hour for lunch and two fifteen minute breaks. Another 
employee, Jimmy, shared a cubicle with Brenda. Jimmy, who worked 
for the public relations department as a marketing clerk, was 
occasionally sloppy with his work. Sometimes, when he was unable to 
complete the work assigned, Brenda helped him with his projects, 
which usually involved using the web to generate internet publicity 
and create new business. Jimmy and Brenda even occasionally dined 
together in Big Burger’s company cafeteria, where Jimmy always ate 
burgers and french fries. 
While at her desk, in addition to conducting her duties, Brenda 
frequently surfed the web and wrote an internet “blog,” a journal that 
chronicled her daily life as a corporate purchasing clerk. Surfing the 
web for personal business was listed as a prohibited activity by the Big 
Burger Employee Handbook. Despite her web surfing, Brenda 
routinely worked longer hours than was required of her, and always 
finished her assigned work. In addition, her high quality work was 
 
 235. Only participants assigned to the Caucasian experimental condition read about Brenda. 
Participants assigned to the African-American experimental condition read about Keisha, an 
African American, and participants assigned to the Hawaiian experimental condition read 
about Ka‘olu, a Hawaiian. 
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documented by her boss, who consistently filed reports praising her 
hard work, intellect, and dedication. Brenda did, however, 
occasionally make long-distance phone calls from her work phone. 
She also occasionally let her friend, who worked in the shipping 
department, come and surf the web on her computer, so long as he 
did it during his fifteen minute breaks. 
Brenda had an employment agreement with Big Burger Company 
that stated: “The Company shall not terminate the Employee without 
good cause, such as the commission of a felony or other morally 
questionable actions.” One day, Brenda posted a web blog that said: 
“Big Burgers should be called Blah Burgers. The burgers are so darn 
boring I wouldn’t eat them if I didn’t get them for free.” Even though 
her blog was anonymous, Jimmy saw her posting the message. The 
next day, the company announced that Brenda’s boss had been 
promoted to another office. Brenda’s new boss came and introduced 
himself. He told Brenda that his performance expectations were 
extremely high for her, and that he wouldn’t tolerate substandard 
work or any other insubordination. Brenda was fired five days later. 
At first she received no explanation, but was later sent a letter stating 
that she failed to meet the “expected standards of employee conduct.” 
After completing the distraction tasks, participants were asked to 
read and respond to sixteen recall questions about each of the stories. 
Participants were instructed to circle “yes” next to facts that were 
accurately reported from the story. If a fact did not accurately 
describe a fact from the story, or if the fact was not in the story at all, 
participants were instructed to circle “no.”236 
The yes/no questions were designed to test how participants 
recalled certain types of information from the stories. For the fight 
scenario, the sixteen questions presented were composed of six actor 
aggression questions, six mitigating circumstances questions, and four 
neutral questions. Aggressiveness questions described an aggressive 
action, such as, “William punched James from behind,” or “After 
James fell to the ground, William kicked him.” Mitigating behavior 
questions described facts that would potentially justify the actor’s 
action or lessen his legal or moral responsibility. Mitigating 
statements included, “After being punched, James took out an object 
from his pocket,” or “When William hit James in the face, he was 
really trying to push him rather than punch him.” Neutral questions 
 
 236. These dependent variable measures are reproduced in their entirety in Appendix A. 
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described facts that would be less relevant in a legal action, such as 
“William wore a tee shirt and jeans,” or “James worked as a 
plumber.” Aggressiveness and mitigating behavior question indexes 
were split into two smaller indexes: one for accurate statements (to 
test for recall errors) and one for inaccurate statements (to test for 
false memories). 
For the employment termination scenario, the sixteen questions 
presented were composed of six actor favorable questions (facts 
relating to good job performance), six actor unfavorable questions 
(facts relating to bad job performance), and four actor neutral 
questions. Half of the questions accurately described facts from the 
story (thereby testing recall accuracy) and half did not (thereby 
testing false memories). 
Because of the design of the questions, participant responses 
could be analyzed to determine not simply the accuracy of people’s 
memories, but also whether errors in memory could systematically 
demonstrate that implicit racial bias manifests in legal decisionmaking 
processes. For example, if participants who read about an African-
American employee more frequently (falsely) recalled that she had 
received mixed reviews from superiors, whereas participants who 
read about a Caucasian employee more frequently (correctly) 
recalled that she had received positive reviews, it would indicate that 
the race of the employee affected participants’ memories in racially 
biased ways.237 
The primary independent variable was the race of the 
protagonist of the story.238 For the fight story, participants read about 
either William, a Caucasian man, Tyronne, an African-American 
man, or Kawika, a Hawaiian man. For the employment story, 
participants read either about Brenda, a Caucasian woman, Keisha, 
an African-American woman, or Ka‘olu, a Hawaiian woman. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a race experimental 
 
 237. Of course, this conclusion assumes that differences in these memory error rates were 
statistically significant. 
 238. Legal culture/Nonlegal culture was another independent variable. Results for that 
variable, however, were mostly not significant and are not discussed in this Article. A few 
individual significant results on this variable did emerge, but displayed effects in opposite 
directions. Future projects will continue to examine the effects of this variable. For a discussion 
of legal culture and its effects, see generally Levinson, supra note 50. 
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condition.239 Other than the names and races of the actors, which were 
explicitly identified in the stories, the stories were identical. 
Most empirical studies on race and law typically have used a 
Black-White study paradigm.240 Though this paradigm reflects a 
significant piece of historical discrimination in the United States, it is 
an incomplete attempt to understand the complex nature of culture 
and discrimination. The increasing diversity within the United 
States241 requires attention to a broader scope of racial and cultural 
diversity in empirical legal studies.242 In addition to testing the 
traditional Black-White paradigm, the study investigated how implicit 
racial bias may manifest in memory processes relating to Native 
Hawaiians. Although the population of Native Hawaiians is not large 
outside the state of Hawai‘i, the history of the Hawaiian people is 
complex, meaningful, and can demonstrate the power of stereotypes 
in the legal context.243 By conducting the empirical study in Hawai‘i, 
the study could achieve three goals that would have been difficult 
 
 239. Participants read about actors of the same race in both stories. For example, 
participants who read about Tyronne also read about Keisha. This was done to reduce the 
chances that participants would recognize what was being tested. 
 240. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 216, at 1016–19 (reviewing a variety of mock jury 
studies). But see, e.g., Harmon M. Hosch et al., A Comparison of Anglo-American and Mexican-
American Jurors’ Judgments of Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Abuse, 21 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1681 (1991) (reviewing two experiments on the differences in 
responses between Mexican-American jurors and Anglo-American jurors). 
 241. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (displaying 
population projections until 2050, based on numbers in 2000 census). 
 242. Studies outside of the law, particularly using the IAT, have incorporated a wide range 
of studies testing implicit biases that spans well beyond the Black-White paradigm. IAT Corp., 
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (offering IATs testing 
implicit attitudes regarding Arabs and Muslims, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, 
among others). 
 243. For more on the challenges faced by the Hawaiian community in the legal system, see, 
for example, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 
1991), Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of 
the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai‘i’s Annexation, and Possible 
Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 512 (1995), Chris K. Iijima, Race over Rice: Binary 
Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in 
Rice v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91, 97 (2000), Noelle M. Kahanu & Jon M. Van Dyke, 
Native Hawaiian Entitlement to Sovereignty: An Overview, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 427, 461–62 
(1995), Le’a Malia Kanehe, Recent Development, The Akaka Bill: The Native Hawaiians’ Race 
for Federal Recognition, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 857, 904–06 (2001), Jon M. Van Dyke, The 
Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 102 & n.41 (1998), 
and Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 47–65 (1995). 
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elsewhere: (1) it could investigate the linkages between Hawaiians 
and implicit memory bias in a culturally and legally relevant context, 
(2) it could examine African-American bias and stereotypes in a 
community with a historically small African-American population244 
(finding implicit biases against African Americans in Hawai‘i might 
tend to illustrate the power of implicit racial bias and its propagation 
through external sources such as media); and (3) it could test biases 
and stereotypes among a diverse population, which would indicate 
that implicit biases are manifested in the legal setting by a broader 
(not just Caucasian) juror population.245  
After completing the recognition task, participants responded to 
the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) test.246 By testing 
participants on both the memory study and the SDO, I could examine 
the relationship, if any, between implicit memory bias and explicit 
racial preferences. The SDO test used in this study was the fourteen-
item SDO introduced by Pratto and her colleagues.247 It included the 
following measures, among others:248 
 
 244. There is, however, a meaningful history of African Americans in Hawai‘i. See generally 
THEY FOLLOWED THE TRADE WINDS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN HAWAII (Miles Jackson ed., 
2004). 
 245. Many studies on race and juries have tested biases only among groups of Caucasian 
participants. Based on the implicit theories I have described, a diverse group of participants 
might be just as susceptible to memory biases. Due to its diverse population and university 
community, Hawai‘i provides a natural place for such investigations. In the study I conducted, 
only twenty-nine participants identified themselves as exclusively Caucasian (this number does 
not include participants who marked multiple ethnic identities, one of which may have been 
Caucasian). This statistic would tend to indicate that results favoring Caucasians would not 
simply be driven by an in-group bias. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 216, at 1006 
(pointing out that many studies of the influence of race on jury decisionmaking have only used 
Caucasian participants); see also Mitchell et al., supra note 216, at 623–24 (making a similar 
observation in the context of mock jury studies on racial bias). Instead, it indicates that (pro-
Caucasian or anti–African American) implicit racial biases can be harbored across a variety of 
races. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (discussing how members of disfavored 
groups sometimes display implicit preferences for more favored groups). 
 246. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. Participants responded to this task last 
because using an explicit measure of racial preferences can activate racial attitudes and 
therefore affect later memory responses. Although it is possible that using the memory measure 
first might prime racial attitudes and influence the later SDO results, this is a lesser risk due to 
the implicit nature of the task. 
 247. Pratto et al., supra note 75, at 760. 
 248. The rest of the measures were: “All humans should be treated equally” (R); “Increased 
social equality” (R); “Some people are just more worthy than others”; “To get ahead in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to step on others”; “In an ideal world, all nations would be equal” (R); 
“Some people are just more deserving than others”; “Equality” (R); “It is not a problem if some 
people have more of a chance in life than others”; “Some people are just inferior to others”; 
02__LEVINSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:48:07 AM 
2007] FORGOTTEN RACIAL EQUALITY 397 
• Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others; 
• This country would be better off if we cared less about how 
equal all people were; 
• It is important that we treat other countries as equals; 249 
• If people were treated more equally we would have fewer 
problems in this country. 
Participants were instructed to respond whether they had a positive 
or negative feeling about the items. For each item, they assigned a 
score. A score of “1” indicated very negative and a score of “7” 
indicated very positive.250 
B. Hypotheses 
This study was designed to test the following hypotheses: 
(1) The accuracy of participants’ memories in recalling legal 
stories would be affected by the race of the actors in the 
stories; 
(2) Participants would make memory errors in a manner 
harmful to African Americans and Hawaiians but helpful to 
Caucasians; and 
(3) Participants who exhibited more implicit bias in making 
memory errors would not necessarily be those who 
exhibited more explicit bias. 
C. Limitations of the Study 
The study complements existing discourse on implicit biases and 
memory errors and provides support for the theory that implicit racial 
bias affects case fact memories within the legal process. Nonetheless, 
this study should only begin the empirical examination of implicit 
racial biases in case fact memories. The methodology used in the 
 
“Increased economic equality” (R). Id. Items marked “(R)” are reverse scored because the 
statements reveal attitudes opposite to those stated in the other items. Reverse scoring also 
helps to ensure that participants carefully read the questionnaire, among other things. 
 249. The third and the fourth items in this list are “reverse scored.” See supra note 248. 
 250. Each number has its own label. A score of “2” means “negative.” A score of 3 means 
“slightly negative.” A score of 4 means “uncertain or neutral.” A score of 5 means “slightly 
positive.” A score of 6 means “positive.” Id. at 745. To convert the responses into a total score, 
half of the measures were reverse coded (for example, scores of 7 are converted to scores of 1) 
and the responses were totaled. Id. at 760. 
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study imperfectly matched true legal processes. For example, the 
study used stories that resembled some aspects of real-life cases, but 
did not use real cases. The study also tested university study 
participants, not real jurors (or judges). Rather than participating in a 
trial, participants simply filled out a multipart survey. This survey 
presented the facts from only one perspective, and was quite far from 
matching true trial processes, which allow for exposure to multiple 
witnesses’ perspectives as well as the opportunity for attorneys to 
cross-examine witnesses. For these reasons and others,251 this 
empirical study alone should not be considered conclusive proof that 
the results generalize to the legal setting.252 Taken in the context of 
existing research on implicit biases and memory errors, however, the 
study offers significant support for that claim and should generate 
real-life concerns about racial justice in legal processes. 
D. Results: Failed Memories and Racial Minorities 
Participants misremembered certain legally relevant facts in a 
racially biased manner. The most telling results emerged from 
participant memories of The Confrontation. Systematic errors in 
recall affected participants’ memories of The Confrontation in a 
manner harmful to African Americans, and to a lesser extent, to 
Hawaiians. 
1. Remembering and Misremembering Aggression in The 
Confrontation.  Participants had an easier time successfully recalling 
aggressive facts when the actor was African American compared to 
 
 251. Another example of the disconnect between the study and real legal processes is the 
ease and simplicity of the stories that were tested. A real case would involve vastly greater 
amounts of information. The judicial process thus requires a much more significant cognitive 
effort by jurors to encode and recall information. Recall, however, that studies on cognitive 
depletion indicate that the greater the attention depletion, the greater the likelihood of 
stereotype-consistent false memories. See Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 72. This memory 
limitation raises the issue of whether memory biases in real cases might be worse than the 
empirical study illustrates. 
 252. Most studies fail in one way or another to replicate the legal setting. One particularly 
impressive effort to replicate the jury environment was conducted by Samuel Sommers. Samuel 
R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Informational and Motivational 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 
(2006). Sommers gained access to Washtenaw county (Michigan) courts, where jurors were 
given an option to participate in his study or a real case. See infra notes 323–26 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this study and its implications. 
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when the actor was Caucasian.253 Combining the responses to all the 
accurate aggression facts, participants who read about Tyronne had a 
recall accuracy rate of 80.2 percent. That is, they failed to recall just 
19.8 percent of facts accurately relating to the actor’s aggressive 
actions. Participants who read about Kawika failed to recall 28.2 
percent of these facts, and participants who read about William failed 
to recall 32.2 percent of these aggressive facts. Thus, participants were 
more likely to remember Tyronne’s aggressive behavior than 
William’s aggressive behavior, even when the facts were quite simple 
and only fifteen minutes or so had elapsed since they read the facts. 
Two instances detailing results of accurate aggressive fact recall help 
illustrate this finding.254 
Example 1 (Aggression—Failed Recall): “When they saw him 
outside a diner, [William/Kawika/Tyronne]255 and his friend 
approached James.”256 
This fact, which would tend to indicate that William initiated the 
fight,257 accurately reflected information from the story. Participants 
who read about Tyronne or Kawika were significantly more likely to 
recall correctly this information than participants who read about 
William.258 Although a resounding 92 percent of participants who read 
 
 253. This result, indicated by an ANOVA (a statistical analysis that tests variance of 
responses), was significant when comparing the three race experimental conditions, F (2, 145) = 
3.47, p < .05. Post-hoc Tukey tests comparing the three race experimental conditions revealed 
that the race of the actor predicted memory accuracy of aggressive facts when comparing the 
Caucasian and African-American experimental conditions, p < .05. 
 254. Chi-square analyses were performed on individual instances of fact recall. These tests 
compared two measures: (1) a race measure comparing the three racial conditions against each 
other in one test, and (2) a majority-minority measure comparing the Caucasian condition to a 
combined group of the Hawaiian and African-American conditions. 
 255. The use of brackets indicates that participants read about only one of the three actors. 
That is, some participants read about William, some read about James, and some read about 
Tyronne. Participants were randomly assigned into these groups. 
 256. Fight Dependent Variable Number Fourteen. See infra Appendix A. 
 257. To avoid the continued use of brackets in the text, for simplicity purposes I sometimes 
refer to just one name when discussing the recall measures. 
 258. This finding was statistically significant when comparing responses for Kawika to 
William, p < .05 and was marginally significant when comparing all three race conditions to each 
other, p < .07. It was also significant when combining responses for the Hawaiian and African 
American race conditions to create a combined index of Caucasian versus non-Caucasian,  
p < .05. 
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about Tyronne or Kawika correctly recalled this aggressive action, 
only 77 percent who read about William recalled it.259 
Example 2 (Aggression—Failed Recall): “[William/Kawika/ 
Tyronne] punched James from behind.”260 
This fact also accurately reflected information from the story. 
Participants who read about Tyronne were more likely to recall 
correctly this fact compared to participants who read about William 
or Kawika. Recall rates of only around 50 percent indicate that 
participants in all groups had a difficult time remembering this fact. 
Yet the recall rates nonetheless point toward a race-based memory 
bias. Only 35 percent and 43 percent of the participants who read 
about Kawika and William, respectively, accurately recalled this 
aggressive fact, whereas 59 percent who read about Tyronne 
accurately recalled it.261 
Although participants recalled accurate aggressive facts in 
racially biased ways, statistical analysis did not indicate that they 
generally had more false memories of aggression when reading about 
an African-American actor compared to a Caucasian actor.262 A 
significant false memory effect, however, did emerge on one of the 
three false memory measures. This example indicates that false 
memories can manifest in the legal setting in biased ways. 
Example 3 (Aggression—False Memory): “After James said 
‘Let it go,’ [William/Kawika/Tyronne] replied by saying ‘What 
if we won’t let it go?’”263 
This statement inaccurately depicts information from the story 
and demonstrates the potential connection between false memories, 
 
 259. Appendix B presents a chart, organized by experimental condition, of the results for 
the individual examples presented in this Part. 
 260. Fight Dependent Variable Number Ten. See infra Appendix A. 
 261. This finding was significant, p < .05, when comparing responses for Tyronne against 
combined responses for William and Kawika. It was marginally significant, p = .055, when 
comparing all three race conditions against each other, and when comparing responses for 
Tyronne compared to William only, p = .071. 
 262. Specifically, the effects of the race experimental condition were not significant on the 
index of combined false memory questions. This index combined participant responses for the 
three false memory questions on aggressive actions into one index measure. I created this index 
to test for overall patterns in false memories of aggression. 
 263. Fight Dependent Variable Number Five. See infra Appendix A. 
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source attribution errors, and implicit memory bias.264 Participants 
who read about Tyronne or Kawika were more likely to exhibit false 
memories for this fact than participants who read about William.265 In 
fact, 70 percent of participants who read about Tyronne or Kawika 
mistakenly believed that the statement was accurate. For participants 
who read about William, 56 percent mistakenly believed it was 
accurate. Thus, although the majority of all participants 
misremembered this fact, participants who read about an African 
American or Hawaiian were significantly more likely to misremember 
it in a manner that would be detrimental to the actor in a legal 
proceeding. 
2. Remembering and Misremembering Mitigating Factors in The 
Confrontation.  With respect to recall accuracy of mitigation 
questions, no significant index differences emerged based on the race 
of the actor. For false memories of mitigating circumstances, 
however, an unexpected result emerged. Participants who read about 
Kawika were more likely to exhibit false memories of mitigating facts 
compared to participants who read about William or Tyronne.266 
Participants who read about Kawika exhibited false memories for 49 
percent of the inaccurate mitigating facts. These facts, if true, would 
have tended to lessen Kawika’s legal or moral responsibility for the 
incident. Participants who read about William and Tyronne exhibited 
false memories for fewer mitigating facts, 38 percent and 37 percent 
of these questions, respectively. These results indicate that the nature 
of implicit biases in memory recall are complex and can be 
multidirectional (they can simultaneously penalize and mitigate). In 
recalling aggressive actions, participants’ memories sometimes 
worked to penalize Kawika, as in Example 1. But in recalling 
mitigating facts, participants’ memories sometimes worked to help 
 
 264. Recall from The Confrontation that it was the actor’s friend, not the actor himself, who 
made that aggressive statement. 
 265. A chi-square analysis indicated that this result was significant, p < .05, in comparing 
responses for William to combined responses for Tyronne and Kawika (thus testing responses 
for a Caucasian actor compared to non-Caucasian actors). It was also marginally significant 
when comparing responses for Tyronne directly to responses for William, p = .062. 
 266. When comparing participants who read about Kawika to a combined group of 
participants who read about either William or Tyronne, an ANOVA was significant, F (1, 150) = 
5.86, p < .05. When comparing separately all three race experimental conditions, an ANOVA on 
the false memory mitigation was marginally significant, F (2, 149) = 2.94, p = .056. 
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Kawika. An instance of a mitigating false memory question helps 
demonstrate this finding. 
Example 4 (Mitigating—False Memory): James shoved 
[William/Kawika/Tyronne].267 
This mitigating statement inaccurately reflected the story and 
thus, if recalled by participants, would constitute a false memory. In 
the story, James shoved Kawika’s friend, not Kawika.268 If James had 
in fact shoved Kawika, it would tend to mitigate later aggressive 
actions taken by Kawika (recall that Kawika responded to the shove 
of his friend by hitting James). Significant results emerged for this 
statement when comparing responses of participants reading about 
Kawika to those reading about William and Tyronne. Of participants 
who read about Kawika, 75 percent exhibited this false memory, 
compared to 57 percent of participants who read about William and 
53 percent of participants who read about Tyronne.269 
It is too early to interpret this result confidently. A possibility 
worth exploring, however, relates to the complex and unique 
relationship between localism in the community270 (among Native 
Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian people alike) and positive and negative 
stereotypes. Such a unique dynamic could simultaneously implicate 
negative stereotypes of aggression and more positive stereotypes 
regarding mitigation (understanding the historical and societal role 
and prevalence of the provocation of Hawaiians, for example).271 As a 
result, the false memory result could be explained if the provocation 
of Hawaiians was a societal stereotype—given that stereotypes are 
linked to false memory generation. Future studies should investigate 
this unique source of false memory and the possibility of 
multidirectional stereotype activation in memory biases. 
3. Instances of Failed Recall and False Memory in Employment 
Story.  Participants exhibited better memories for the employment 
 
 267. Fight Dependent Variable Number Sixteen. See infra Appendix A. 
 268. A false memory in this case would thus involve a source attribution error. 
 269. A chi-square analysis indicated that results were significant for Hawaiians compared to 
Caucasians, p < .05, and Hawaiians compared to African Americans, p < .05. 
 270. Eric Yamamoto, The Significance of Local, in SOCIAL PROCESSES IN HAWAI‘I 138, 
138–49 (Peter Manicus ed., 1974). 
 271. The existence of positive and negative stereotypes about a group of people should not 
be surprising and has been documented in psychological studies such as the IAT. 
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scenario than for The Confrontation.272 Overall, participants had a 94 
percent recall accuracy rate for the employment scenario and a 71.2 
percent recall accuracy rate for The Confrontation. Similarly, 
participants made fewer false memory errors for the employment 
scenario than they did for The Confrontation. Participants exhibited a 
15.2 percent false memory rate for the employment scenario 
compared to a 34 percent false memory rate for The Confrontation. 
Though the stories read by participants were not exceedingly simple, 
they were significantly simpler than the stories typically heard by 
jurors, and somewhat simpler than other memory studies on juries or 
mock juries.273 The results indicate that the employment scenario was 
perhaps too easy for participants to recall. Yet, it is unclear why The 
Confrontation, also a simple story, generated significant errors 
whereas the employment story did not. One possibility (consistent 
with memory error research) is that The Confrontation contained 
more racially stereotyped facts than the employment story, which 
made errors more likely to occur when the actor’s race was varied. 
Despite the few significant results that were obtained in the 
employment study, the employment discrimination arena should not 
be discounted when discussing memory errors. Future tests should 
examine the employment domain in more realistic and more 
stereotype-consistent situations.274 Researchers might also consider 
varying gender in addition to race, as gender has been shown to 
trigger stereotype-consistent false memories in the employment 
context.275 
Within the employment story, though the indexes did not reveal 
significant effects, an interesting and significant false memory did 
emerge.276 
 
 272. These results are not due to the order in which the stories were presented. To eliminate 
order effects, participants were presented the scenarios in both orders. 
 273. Compare the case fact data presented in the memory study conducted by Pritchard & 
Keenan, supra note 8. In that study, participants viewed a thirty-five minute video of court 
testimony and were quizzed for recall. Id. at 593–94. The test in this study was substantially 
easier. 
 274. It would also be interesting to test an employment scenario detailing a management-
level job rather than an entry-level job. Stereotypes about certain groups may be more likely to 
function in a job with significant responsibility than in a job closer to entry level. 
 275. See Lenton et al., supra note 152, at 9–11; Macrae et al., supra note 152, at 74. 
 276. Two other facts in this story generated at least marginally significant results. 
Employment Dependent Variable Number Twelve, see infra Appendix A, Brenda was allowed a 
one hour lunch break (an accurate memory), generated significant results, p < .05, such that 
participants made more recall errors for this fact when reading about Brenda compared to 
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Example 5 (Competence—False Memory): “[Brenda/Ka‘olu/ 
Keisha] was named Employee of the Month.”277 
This statement was inaccurate. Participants who had false 
memories of this statement erroneously believed that the employee 
achieved this honor. In the story, it was the employee’s father, not the 
employee, who earned this award. The results indicated that 
participants who read about Brenda, compared to those who read 
about Keisha and Ka‘olu, were more likely to have false memories of 
the employee achieving this honor.278 Participants who read about 
Brenda had false memories of it 17 percent of the time whereas 
participants who read about Keisha and Ka‘olu had false memories of 
it 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively.279 
4. Implicit Memory Bias and Explicit Racial Preferences.  I next 
measured whether there was a relationship between explicit racial 
preferences (as measured by the SDO scale) and memory recall. For 
memory recall indexes (such as the aggression recall index for The 
Confrontation) and for most individual memory recall measures, 
there was no significant relationship between memory recall and 
explicit racial preferences. This finding indicates that participants who 
manifested more memory bias were not more likely to be explicitly 
biased. A few individual instances of memory recall in the African-
American and Hawaiian experimental conditions, however, did 
indicate a relationship (both correlative and predictive) in the 
opposite direction. That is, in a few instances people with lower SDO 
scores (indicating less explicit racism) were actually more likely to 
demonstrate more racially biased recall than people with higher SDO 
scores. 
 
Keisha or Ka‘olu. In addition, Employment Dependent Variable Number Five, see infra 
Appendix A, Brenda frequently surfed the web (also an accurate memory), generated marginally 
significant results, p < .07. This result indicated that participants who read about Keisha made 
more recall errors for this fact compared to those who read about Brenda or Ka‘olu. 
 277. Employment Dependent Variable Number Two. See infra Appendix A. 
 278. A chi-square analysis revealed that this effect was significant, measuring all three race 
conditions against each other, p < .05. 
 279. It would be premature to make conclusions based upon this lone significant finding or 
upon the other at least marginally significant results described supra note 266. One possibility 
worth investigating, however, is whether such memory errors made by corporate managers, for 
example, could retrospectively and unknowingly bolster performance evaluations or promotion 
decisions of a Caucasian employee relative to an African-American or Hawaiian employee. 
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I tested the correlation between the memory measures (both 
indexes and individual questions) and total SDO scores for 
participants in each race condition, and followed these correlations up 
with linear regression analyses. For the memory index responses and 
most individual memory questions, no significant results emerged. 
For a few individual memory measures, however, significant 
correlations and predictive relationships emerged. The following 
examples illustrate this unexpected effect. 
Significant correlations emerged in the African-American 
experimental condition for SDO scores and the following memory 
measures: (1) After James fell to the ground, Tyronne kicked him 
(false); and (2) When Tyronne hit James in the face, he was really 
trying to push him rather than punch him (true). The first memory 
measure above was negatively correlated to SDO score and the 
second was positively correlated to SDO score.280 Because the first 
statement is false and the second statement is true, these opposite 
correlations indicate that participants who explicitly favored racial 
equality were (1) more likely to have false memories that Tyronne 
kicked James and (2) less likely to recall accurately that Tyronne was 
trying to push James rather than punch him. Linear regression 
analyses were also significant for these measures, indicating that SDO 
scores served as predictors for these two memory measures in the 
same surprising direction. These two examples provide 
counterintuitive results, indicating that participants who explicitly 
favored more social equality sometimes were more likely to recall 
facts in biased ways than those who explicitly favored less social 
equality.281 
In the Hawaiian experimental condition, a significant correlation 
emerged between memory recall and SDO score for the memory 
measure Ka‘olu used her phone to make long distance calls. This 
memory measure was significantly correlated with overall SDO score 
in the negative direction.282 This correlation means that the more 
likely participants were to favor equality (generating a lower SDO 
 
 280. Two-tailed Pearson correlations were significant for both of these memory measures,  
p < .05. 
 281. It should be noted that the relationship between SDO scores and implicit measures are 
relative. That is, people who favor “less social equality” did not necessary disapprove of social 
equality and were not necessarily explicitly racist. Instead, relative to other participants in the 
study, those who favored less equality were more likely to respond to certain questions in the 
manner reported. 
 282. A two-tailed Pearson correlation was significant for this measure, p < .05. 
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score), the more likely they were to remember accurately this fact 
about Ka‘olu. A linear regression analysis was also significant for this 
memory measure, indicating that SDO score served as a negative 
predictor of this accurate memory recall response.283 
Taken together, the correlation and regression results indicate 
that explicit racial preferences and implicit recall bias usually were 
not significantly related. In the African-American and Hawaiian 
conditions, however, there were individual instances in which lower 
explicit bias actually predicted greater memory bias. In the Caucasian 
condition, there was one instance in which higher explicit bias 
predicted greater memory bias.284 
IV.  IMPLICIT BIASES, CULTURAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND DEBIASING 
The results of the empirical study, combined with existing 
research on implicit social cognition and memory, lead to the 
conclusion that implicit memory biases most likely operate in legal 
decisionmaking. The implications of this conclusion should raise 
concern: the legal system simultaneously embraces a mission of social 
justice while employing an implicitly biased decisionmaking process 
that hinders justice from being done. But how should lawmakers and 
scholars approach this problem? Research has shown that memory 
errors are pervasive, meaningful, and hard to correct.285 Similarly, 
social scientists have demonstrated that implicit biases are 
“widespread”286 and frequently resistant to intervention. Thus, a 
multifaceted approach must be considered. 
 
 283. The linear regression analysis was significant, p < .05. A regression also indicated that a 
neutral memory measure, Ka‘olu worked as a marketing clerk, was also predicted by SDO by 
regression in the negative direction, t = -2.39, p < .05. 
 284. In the Caucasian experimental condition, a two-tiered Pearson correlation coefficient 
was significant (in the positive direction) between memory recall and SDO score for the 
measure William and his friend hit James one time each. This measure indicates opposite results 
than those in the African-American and Hawaiian conditions. The more likely participants were 
to favor racial and social hierarchy explicitly (generating a higher SDO score), the more likely 
they were to have false memories of this (mitigating) fact favoring William (recall from the story 
that William actually hit James twice). A linear regression analysis was also significant for this 
memory measure, indicating that SDO score served as a predictor of this false memory 
response. The linear regression analysis was significant, t = 3.11, p < .05. Thus, unlike the 
instances in the African-American and Hawaiian conditions indicating lower explicit racial 
preferences sometimes served as a predictor of implicit memory bias, this instance indicated that 
higher explicit racial preference predicted implicit memory bias. 
 285. See supra Part II.A. 
 286. See Lane et al., supra note 44, at 12. 
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This Part discusses potential responses to implicit memory bias 
and argues that both debiasing and cultural solutions must be 
pursued. A debiasing287 solution responds to implicit memory bias by 
using interventions such as exposure to “counterstereotypes”288 to 
lessen the negative effects of implicit bias during legal 
decisionmaking.289 A cultural solution requires recognizing the link 
between historical and societal discrimination and the continued 
exhibition of implicit biases. Taken together, these approaches hold 
promise that implicit memory bias may someday be significantly 
reduced or even eliminated. 
A. Debiasing of Memory Errors and Stereotypes 
Debiasing efforts have significant practical potential to reduce or 
temporarily eliminate implicit memory biases.290 A debiasing 
approach to the problem of implicit memory bias can involve two 
interrelated tactics—improving overall memory accuracy and 
reducing the strength, frequency, or pervasiveness of implicit racial 
biases. Both types of tactics provide clues as to how taking specific 
procedural actions within the legal system can reduce the harmful 
effects of implicit memory bias. 
1. Improving Memory Accuracy and Reducing False Memories.  
Two different styles of memory improvement efforts might help 
mitigate the effects of implicit memory bias. First, research on 
reducing memory errors offers clues about how jury instructions or 
other debiasing measures might help mitigate memory inaccuracies. 
These projects often suggest that implementing “late correction” 
strategies can reduce some memory errors, although the reduction of 
 
 287. A debiasing methodology uses experimental interventions to lessen the severity or 
temporarily halt implicit biases. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 3, at 1580; Kang & Banaji, supra note 
44, at 1101–08; Page, supra note 22, at 239. 
 288. Exposure to “counterstereotypic[] exemplars” is one of the “fair measures” proposed 
by Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1105. Such an example shows why cultural change and 
debiasing are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Kang and Banaji suggest that using “debiasing 
agents” might over time help reduce stereotypes by changing the way people think about social 
categories. See id. at 1108. This link between cultural change and science exemplifies the 
potential power of embracing the “fair measures” model Kang and Banaji suggest. 
 289. As I use the term in this Article, debiasing solutions also include taking practical 
interventions such as bolstering juror access to information during and after trial. 
 290. There are also theoretical implications. Debiasing studies may offer clues as to why the 
pervasive effects of implicit biases continue to prosper in people’s automatic cognitive 
processes. 
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stereotype-related memory errors has proved particularly 
challenging. Second, practical solutions such as juror note taking and 
question asking can help improve memory retention in the legal 
process. Though these strategies have not been investigated with 
regard to racial memory biases, they offer hope that general memory 
improvement will help reduce racially biased errors. 
In light of the compelling evidence linking false memory 
generation to stereotypes, researchers have begun exploring ways to 
try to moderate the potentially harmful effects of stereotype-
consistent false memories. These efforts have yielded mixed success 
and serve as a reminder that trying to reduce the harmful effects of 
stereotypes is a difficult process. Keith Payne and his colleagues 
examined whether instructing participants to respond to memory 
tasks based on their confidence levels might help reduce stereotype-
consistent false memories.291 If stereotype-consistent false memories 
emerge only when people make guesses, they hypothesized, then 
instructing people to answer only when they are subjectively 
confident in their memory should eliminate stereotype-consistent 
false memories.292 The results of the study indicated that giving such 
instructions helped improve general memory accuracy, but did not 
reduce the amount of stereotype-consistent false memories. In fact, 
participants were just as likely to display stereotype-consistent false 
memories when they expressed 100 percent certainty in their memory 
judgments as when they expressed zero certainty.293 Encouraging 
jurors to rely on their memory confidence levels, then, appears to be a 
less than promising way of reducing memory errors. The study also 
raises the concern that taking steps to improve general memory 
accuracy, as I propose elsewhere, will not necessarily lead to 
reduction in stereotype-consistent memory errors. Other studies 
provide a little more optimism for generating a legal process response 
to implicit memory bias. Such a response might involve employing 
 
 291. B. Keith Payne et al., Memory Monitoring and the Control of Stereotype Distortion, 40 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 53 (2004). 
 292. See id. at 54. In part I of the experiment, participants performed a memory test in which 
they studied a list of “Black” and “White” names (those typically associated with Black or 
White individuals), which were randomly grouped together with one of two occupations 
(basketball player or politician), typically associated with Black or White individuals. Id. at 55. 
As in other studies described, results for this test indicated the expected stereotype-consistent 
false memories. Id. at 56. 
 293. See id. at 58. 
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debiasing tasks in connection with jury instructions to reduce 
stereotype-consistent false memories. 
a. Late Correction Memory Strategies.  Richard Marsh and his 
colleagues found that using conscious memory control processes may 
reduce people’s reliance on stereotypes in making source attributions. 
Participants viewed a series of gender-stereotype-consistent 
statements (such as “I made a centerpiece for the dining table”) along 
with the gender-neutral name of the person who made the 
statement.294 After a distraction task, the experimenters revealed the 
gender and sexual orientation of the people who made the 
statements. They then asked participants to recall who made the 
statements. Results indicated that gender and sexual orientation 
stereotypes consistently influenced source attribution errors. For 
example, participants overattributed stereotypically male statements 
to heterosexual males and homosexual females. 
The experimenters next tested whether “late correction” 
memory strategies might reduce or eliminate the source attribution 
bias. Before responding to the recall task, participants were told to 
list reasons why they believed stereotypes were harmful in today’s 
society.295 Implementing this simple task reduced some but not all 
source attribution errors. For example, participants became more 
accurate in attributing masculine-stereotyped statements to 
homosexual males.296 The moderate success in correcting stereotype-
consistent source attribution errors indicates that late correction 
memory strategies hold promise for reducing legal errors based on 
stereotypes. In keeping with “late correction” delivery, these 
correction strategies could be implemented simultaneously with jury 
instructions.297 Practical problems, however, might arise in the jury 
context with a debiasing task that requires jurors to make a list about 
 
 294. Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias Sourcemonitoring 
Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 150–51 (2006). This was the methodology for the first portion of 
the study. 
 295. Id. at 156. In keeping with the late correction theory, participants made this list 
between viewing the statements and recalling who made the statements. Id. at 156–57. 
 296. Id. at 157. The instruction, however, did not significantly reduce source attributions 
relying upon the “masculine” stereotype of homosexual females and only slightly reduced the 
number of total attribution errors made. 
 297. Other commentators concerned with juror information-processing inefficiencies have 
argued for debiasing instructions. E.g., Prescott & Starr, supra note 181, at 342 (stating that such 
debiasing instructions can “hardly hurt”). The efforts I propose could be combined with such 
efforts. 
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the harms of stereotypes to effectively debias. Yet it is too early to 
rule out any solutions, even potentially impractical ones. 
b. Juror Note Taking and Question Asking.  Another type of 
memory debiasing takes advantage of procedural tasks such as note 
taking to combat memory errors. One of the more popular arguments 
in support of juror note taking is the commonsense expectation that 
note taking allows jurors to refresh their memories.298 Benefits of note 
taking have been verified empirically. In one such study, Professors 
Horwitz and ForsterLee found that mock jurors who were allowed to 
take notes during a mock trial did a better job of assessing relevant 
factual information, including distinguishing between ”differentially 
worthy plaintiffs.”299 This increased accuracy level exceeded much 
smaller improvements shown by mock jurors who did not take notes 
but had transcript access.300 
Because the trial judge makes decisions regarding note taking in 
most jurisdictions,301 keeping track of statistics on the prevalence of 
juror note taking is difficult. If the vast majority of courts already 
allow or even encourage note taking, then suggesting note taking 
reforms becomes superfluous. Studies, however, reveal mixed results. 
A 1988 survey by Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod indicated that 
approximately one-third of trial judges allow note taking at trial.302 
Since then, however, projects have pointed to a trend in allowing note 
taking, even calling the practice “widespread.”303 Whatever the true 
estimate of juror note taking may be, judges should encourage jurors 
to take detailed notes of relevant facts.  
 
 298. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis 
and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 569 (1997). 
 299. Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial 
Transcript Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
373, 374, 387 (2001). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Smith, supra note 298, at 568. 
 302. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Legal Institutions: Some Suggestions for the Critical 
Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229 (1990). 
 303. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 108 (2005) (citing JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 
141 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997)). This trend, in part, may be due to strong 
support for juror note taking by well respected organizations such as the American Bar 
Association and Brookings Institution. Id. at 109 (citing CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 18 (1992) (calling juror note taking the “most widely suggested reform for 
enhancing juror comprehension”)). 
02__LEVINSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:48:07 AM 
2007] FORGOTTEN RACIAL EQUALITY 411 
In addition to their calls for juror note taking reform, scholars 
concerned about juror memory errors and cognitive load outside of 
the implicit bias context have called for additional reforms such as 
question asking (where jurors may submit questions to the judge 
during trial) and jury discussions throughout the trial.304 These 
scholars have pointed out that “active juror” reforms improve juror 
information processing and self-monitoring.305 Encouraging wider-
scale note taking, question asking, and transcript access might reduce 
implicit memory bias by bolstering overall memory accuracy. There is 
no evidence, however, that these steps reduce particular memory 
errors, generation of false memories, or stereotype-consistent 
memory bias. Further research should be conducted to determine 
whether these procedural steps, perhaps in combination with late 
correction memory control techniques (as implemented by Professor 
Marsh and his colleagues) can help reduce implicit memory biases. 
Researchers must also continue to investigate strategies to reduce or 
temporarily eliminate stereotype-consistent memory errors. Studies 
in this area have not been as successful as hoped, leading some 
researchers to conclude that the best way to change stereotype-
consistent false memories is to change the stereotypes themselves.306 
2. Temporarily Reducing Implicit Biases.  A significant amount 
of research has focused on whether implicit biases can be temporarily 
eliminated or moderated.307 These efforts have achieved mixed levels 
of success, and indicate that exposure to diversity or viewing minority 
exemplars, for example, can sometimes temporarily reduce people’s 
implicit biases.308 None of this research has directly tested how implicit 
memory bias might be reduced, nor has it been applied to jury 
decisionmaking.309 Nevertheless, studies indicate that confronting 
jurors with their implicit biases, striving for more diverse juries, and 
facilitating a more counterstereotypic community of lawyers and 
judges could help reduce the occurrence of implicit memory bias. It 
must be noted, however, that before any concrete suggestions should 
 
 304. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 181, at 342. 
 305. Id. at 342–43. 
 306. See Sherman et al., supra note 197, at 238. 
 307. Some of these studies have been reviewed in other contexts. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 
3, at 1494; Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1065; Page, supra note 22, at 160. 
 308. Page, supra note 22 at 237 (citing Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 38, at 800). 
 309. But see supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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be implemented, more research must be conducted to confirm that 
these changes would improve legal decisionmaking. 
a. More Counterstereotypic Attorneys and Judges.  Some studies 
indicate that exposing jurors to minority exemplars such as attorneys 
and judges might help reduce implicit memory bias. A study by 
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald found that exposure to 
admired minority exemplars can decrease implicit preferences.310 
After taking a Black-White IAT, participants viewed pictures of 
“famous and admired” African Americans, such as Denzel 
Washington, and “infamous and disliked” Caucasian Americans, such 
as Jeffrey Dahmer.311 After exposure to these pictures (which the 
experimenters presented under the guise of being a test of famous 
person recognition), participants immediately retook an IAT and 
took yet another IAT after twenty-four hours. Results indicated that 
the exposure to the African-American exemplars and disliked 
Caucasians reduced (but did not eliminate) automatic pro-White 
implicit bias, and that bias reduction continued for at least twenty-
four hours.312 
A study by Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari harnessed this knowledge 
to test how exemplary leaders can affect women’s automatic biases 
about their own in-group.313 The study indicated that exposure to 
women in leadership positions can lead to a reduction of in-group 
implicit biases among women.314 One important contribution of 
 
 310. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 38, at 806. 
 311. Id. at 802. 
 312. Id. at 803–04. These results were reported in contrast to participants in a control 
condition (who saw no images) and in a pro-White exemplar condition. The researchers also 
found similar effects in reducing implicit bias related to elderly. Interestingly, though a 
reduction in implicit attitudes was found, explicit racial preferences were not significantly 
altered. Id. at 805. 
 313. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to 
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender 
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 645 (2004). 
 314. Id. at 654. Other studies have investigated gender stereotype reduction using mental 
imagery. Unlike real-life exposure to counterstereotypic (human) exemplars as investigated by 
Dasgupta and Asgari, Irene Blair and her colleagues tested how simply imagining and then 
describing a “strong woman” (for example) might reduce implicit bias as measured on the IAT. 
Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes 
through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 829–30 (2001). Their results 
were significant, indicating that mentally accessing a counterstereotype can help reduce implicit 
bias. Id. at 837. Recent research also indicates that appealing to a person’s egalitarian beliefs can 
help moderate discriminatory behavior. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic 
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Dasgupta and Asgari’s study was that it examined the role of 
exemplars in naturally occurring leadership roles (such as college 
students’ exposure to female professors). Their results indicate that 
certain environments, such as those “in which women frequently 
occupy counterstereotypic leadership roles” can undermine automatic 
stereotypes.315 Results such as these, which illustrate the debiasing 
potential of exemplars, prompted Professors Kang and Banaji to 
argue for “fair measures” in hiring more counterstereotypic 
employees.316 Implementing a fair measures paradigm in the legal 
profession (which would include a systematic effort to increase 
counterstereotypic law students, lawyers, and judges) could 
eventually generate debiasing benefits in jury decisionmaking.317 
b. Confronting Jurors with Biases.  Research indicates that 
explicitly confronting people with their biases may be an effective 
tool in decreasing stereotyped responses. A study by Alexander 
Czopp and his colleagues found that even though confrontations can 
create hostility toward a confronter, they can (at least temporarily) 
also reduce stereotypes.318 The study asked participants to participate 
in an online chat.319 During this chat, the experimenters asked 
participants to give their impressions about pictures and statements. 
These pictures and statements were designed deliberately so that they 
would invoke at least some racial stereotypes, thus assuring that 
participant responses would be racially stereotype-consistent enough 
to allow for confrontation.320 After the participants gave such 
stereotype-consistent responses, a collaborator (who was posing as 
another participant in the online chat) confronted them about their 
potentially racist responses.321 After the confrontation, participants 
 
Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and 
Behavioral Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 270 (2006) (testing the 
relationship between egalitarian beliefs and anti-gay behaviors). 
 315. Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 313, at 654. 
 316. Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1066–67. 
 317. It is hard to predict, however, how positive effects of an African-American attorney or 
judge, for example, would interact with the negative effects of a stereotype-consistent African-
American criminal defendant. 
 318. Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing up for a Change: Reducing Bias through 
Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784, 799 (2006). 
 319. Id. at 787. 
 320. Id. at 787–88. 
 321. Id. at 792. For example, one resembled the following: “but maybe it would be good to 
think about Blacks in other ways that are a little more fair? it [sic] just seems that a lot of times 
02__LEVINSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:48:07 AM 
414 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:345 
were given a confidential stereotype test (participants were alone—no 
collaborator was present to influence or confront them). The 
researchers found that post-confrontation participant responses 
displayed significantly fewer stereotypes (compared to responses 
given before the confrontation). One potential practical implication 
of this line of research involves using racial stereotype measures on 
pretrial jury questionnaires, and nonthreateningly confronting jurors 
with their biases during voir dire or jury instructions.322 
c. More Diverse Juries.  Studies have linked culture and 
diversity to the reduction of implicit biases. These studies indicate 
that racially diverse juries, for example, may make fewer cognitive 
errors than homogeneous jurors, and that learning about or 
experiencing diversity and multicultural ideologies in general can 
reduce implicit bias. In a study of legal decisionmaking processes, 
Samuel Sommers recorded and evaluated mock jury deliberations.323 
Some mock juries included only Caucasians and others included both 
Caucasians and African Americans.324 Sommers found that racially 
heterogeneous mock juries cited more facts from the case, made 
fewer errors when discussing facts (and when they did make errors, 
were more likely to correct them325), and were more open to 
discussing racism than homogeneous Caucasian juries.326 Although 
 
Blacks don’t get equal treatment in our society. you [sic] know what i [sic] mean?” Id. at 788. 
The confrontations were successful using low-level threats (such as the one quoted) and high-
level threats (which involved mentioning that the participant’s responses sounded racist). Id. at 
791. 
 322. The exact method of how to nonthreateningly confront jurors should be studied 
carefully. In choosing a starting point for such studies, it would wise be to consider that 
individual jurors should not feel singled out or blamed for their implicit attitudes (that is, they 
should understand that implicit bias is common and difficult to control). It is important to note 
that there are no indicators yet that such a juror confrontation would reduce implicit bias in the 
legal setting. Before implementing any juror confrontation scheme, the specific design should be 
tested empirically. Debiasing judges through confrontations would require other measures, but 
could perhaps be done in connection with diversity training courses. 
 323. Sommers, supra note 252, at 600. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Recall that in Prichard and Keenan’s study, jury deliberation barely helped correct 
individual memory errors. See Prichard & Keenan, supra note 8, at 600. Although Sommers did 
not employ a methodology designed to test the statistical significance of memory error 
correction generally, his study raises the possibility that diverse juries (which were not reported 
and presumably not tested by Pritchard and Keenan) might have a unique ability to correct 
more memory errors than homogeneous juries. Such a theory should be tested empirically. See 
Sommers, supra note 252, at 608. 
 326. Id. at 605–06. 
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Sommers did not test implicit bias reduction, the results hold promise 
that diverse juries might better overcome implicit memory biases than 
homogeneous juries. In practice, however, calling for more diverse 
juries is controversial. Courts are hesitant to apply diversity rationales 
to petit juries, and will generally look only at juror representation 
across a larger community.327 If other measures are less effective in 
overcoming implicit memory bias, however, then striving for (or even 
requiring through legislation) heterogeneous juries might be 
warranted, particularly when from the case facts involve members of 
stereotyped groups. 
d. Juror Diversity Training.  Implementing diversity or 
multiculturalism training for jurors might similarly help reduce 
memory biases. A study by Jennifer Richeson and Richard Nussbaum 
found that exposing participants to a multicultural viewpoint, 
compared to a “color-blind” viewpoint, resulted in lesser implicit bias 
on the Black-White IAT.328 In that study, participants learned about 
either the virtues of multiculturalism (celebrating differences across 
groups) or color blindness (ignoring differences across groups).329 This 
simple introduction to the two ideologies was enough to affect IAT 
outcome.330 Those who learned about multiculturalism reduced their 
implicit biases and displayed significantly less implicit bias than those 
who learned about color-blindness.331 
A study by Laurie Rudman and her colleagues tested the effects 
of a diversity education program and found similar results to 
Richeson and Nussbaum, indicating that learning the values of 
diversity can at least temporarily reduce implicit bias.332 In that study, 
participants voluntarily attended a fourteen-week diversity and 
 
 327. Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 668 (2002) 
(citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). 
 328. Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus 
Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 420 (2004). 
 329. Id. at 419. The learning process included reading about multiculturalism or color-
blindness as well as writing about it. Id. 
 330. Id. at 420. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Unlearning Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit 
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 865 (2001). The 
researchers did point to evidence, however, that forced compliance with “pro-Black” requests 
can result in anger and backlash. Id. at 857 (citing E. A. Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses 
to Other Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 486, 491 (2001)). 
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conflict seminar, during which they learned about intergroup conflict, 
engaged in discussions, and kept a journal.333 Experimenters gave 
participants IAT tests both prior to and after the semester. Results 
indicated that students in the diversity and conflict seminar reduced 
both their implicit racial biases (as measured by the IAT) and explicit 
racial biases, whereas those in the control group (who received no 
diversity training) did not.334 These studies indicate that diversity or 
multiculturalism training could potentially help juries reduce implicit 
racial biases. Yet implementing a mandatory diversity course, for 
example, could backfire if jurors became angry about being required 
to participate (an emotion that could be common considering that 
people are often unaware of their implicit biases). Thus, before 
implementing training, further research should be conducted to test 
what types of training programs jurors would tolerate without 
backlash.335 One possibility is that diversity training would perhaps 
generate less resistance from jurors if it were a component of a larger 
juror education or training program. 
A large volume of work supports the theory that increasing an 
understanding of out-group members will lead to reduction in 
prejudice336 (in the language of intergroup contact theory, ”familiarity 
breeds liking”337). This work reaffirms that exposure to people across 
groups acts to reduce biases, particularly under optimal conditions. A 
 
 333. Id. at 858. Other participants, who were in the control group, were enrolled in a 
research methods course. Id. It is interesting to note that (in the first experiment conducted) 
participants in the training group were taught by an African-American professor while 
participants in the control group were taught by a Caucasian professor. Id. Thus, effects 
generated between the two groups might have emerged from effects similar to those 
demonstrated by Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 313, at 806. The experimenters corrected this 
potential confound in the second experiment by having the same African-American professor 
teach the control group’s course. Results in experiment 2 indicated the same bias-reduction 
results as in experiment 1—for the experimental group but not for the control group. Rudman 
et al., supra note 332, at 863–64. 
 334. Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 313, at 860–61. 
 335. Jury training has been suggested in other contexts. See, e.g., Stephen E. Fienberg & 
Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical 
Evidence and Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 771 (1986) (advocating juror 
instruction in Bayesian statistical probabilities); James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial 
Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 326 (1988) (suggesting that juror “impartiality 
training” be implemented); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality 
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 
67, 132–34 (2002) (discussing training effectiveness generally and applying it to judges). 
 336. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda L. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact 
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006). 
 337. Id. 
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meta-analysis by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp demonstrated 
that across hundreds of studies, intergroup contact does in fact lead to 
prejudice reduction.338 The researchers found that intergroup contact 
that comported with Allport’s 1954 formulation of “optimal contact” 
created the most prejudice reduction. These optimal contact 
conditions include equal status, common goals, intergroup 
cooperation, and the support of authority, such as the law.339 
Interestingly, Allport’s optimal conditions appear to describe the 
mandate, function, and process of juries. Thus, the possibility is raised 
not only that diverse juries may display less prejudice (as investigated 
by Sommers340), but also that the experience of being on a diverse jury 
itself could lead to less future prejudice.341 
3. Future Directions.  The ways in which implicit biases can be 
moderated and memory errors reduced provide hope for bias 
reduction and demonstrate the importance of future research. The 
research I have described indicates that although much progress has 
been made, greater efforts are needed. Implicit racial biases are 
elicited quickly and easily, and can only be temporarily reduced 
through interventional approaches. Biased memory errors, too, have 
resisted correction. Though general memory has been shown to 
improve with procedural measures, researchers are only beginning to 
understand how stereotype-consistent memory errors might be 
reduced. The effort in both of these areas must continue so that a 
comprehensive legal model of implicit memory bias–reducing 
measures can be developed. 
B. Cognitive Biases, Cultural Change, and Social Justice 
Although debiasing alone could potentially succeed in at least 
temporarily reducing the harms of implicit memory bias, a permanent 
elimination of the bias (and implicit biases generally) will best occur 
 
 338. Id. The positive effects were not limited to perceptions of other group members. Id. 
 339. Id. at 752 (citing GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954)). The 
meta-analysis indicated that these conditions are best viewed as a “bundle” (meaning that they 
are most effective if all conditions are met). The researchers do note, however, that the 
institutional support criterion might be especially important. Prejudice can still be reduced 
without the presence of the optimal conditions though. Id. at 766. 
 340. Sommers, supra note 252, at 608. 
 341. See Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 336, at 768 (noting that although there are some 
indicators that intergroup contact reduces future prejudice, more longitudinal studies are 
needed). 
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through a sustained process of cultural change. There are three 
primary reasons why cultural change is the best way to deal with 
implicit memory biases. First, research has connected stereotypes, 
one of the building blocks of implicit memory bias, to deep societal 
and scientific roots and shown that they become socially ingrained 
and resistant to change at a very early age.342 Although debiasing 
measures might temporarily moderate or reverse a negative 
stereotype, the only way to avoid a negative stereotype completely is 
to remove that stereotype from the socializing forces of the culture. 
Second, scholars have demonstrated that people manifest implicit 
desires to maintain social order (as illustrated by System Justification 
Theory), even when such desires subordinate socially disfavored 
groups and are inconsistent with their explicit attitudes.343 Although a 
debiasing intervention may be able to temporarily moderate an 
implicit desire to subordinate a disfavored group, the best way to 
avoid implicit subordination is to remove the socially disfavored 
status of a subordinated group. Such a change can best be made at a 
cultural level. Third, unlike debiasing measures, which may be highly 
scientific and sometimes cognitively inaccessible to laypersons, 
cultural change can be part of a larger movement to achieve social 
equality, healing, and the overcoming of historical injustice. 
Achieving cultural change is not a simple task. It must be 
accomplished using mixed methodologies. One multimethod 
approach to cultural change is proposed by Rudman, who presents 
several suggestions consistent both with cultural responsibility and 
scientific theory.344 These suggestions include combining elements of 
education, policy advocacy, intergroup contact, and social 
inclusiveness in order to achieve change. Legal scholars should take 
note that these solutions are neither entirely empirical nor are they 
primarily debiasing-focused. Instead, they are diverse in 
methodologies and reflect a broader understanding of implicit biases 
as a societal problem. Specifically, Rudman calls for informing people 
about implicit biases, followed by “efforts to retain and expand 
policies that serve to override them, including affirmation action”;345 
 
 342. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Blasi & Jost, supra note 81, at 1142; Jost et al., supra note 80, at 912; Rudman, 
supra note 31, at 133. 
 344. Rudman, supra note 31 at 138–39. 
 345. Id. at 138 (pointing out the overly optimistic nature of affirmative action’s twenty-five 
year “shelf life” under Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). These suggestions are 
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providing people the opportunity to be more emotionally comfortable 
with out-group members;346 and recognizing the cultural influences on 
the self while striving for a more inclusive society. These proposed 
solutions provide legally relevant pathways that can be implemented 
to eventually reduce the harmful effects of implicit memory bias. In 
fact, scholars have already begun embracing each of these 
suggestions. Professors Kang and Banaji have argued that “fair 
measures” must be taken specifically to combat the societal harms of 
implicit biases.347 Scholars of intergroup contact have confirmed that 
sharing experiences with out-group members truly works to reduce 
biases.348 And legal commentators beginning with Charles Lawrence 
have recognized the importance of recognizing culture’s influences on 
the self within a broader legal and societal context.349 It is now time to 
coordinate these efforts for change. 
Ignoring cultural responsibility for implicit racial biases is not 
simply a failure to connect the cause of the bias to the bias itself or a 
failure to develop an accurate model of legal decisionmaking. Instead, 
ignoring the cultural foundations of implicit bias risks minimizing the 
responsibility of the legal system to deal with a society that continues 
to exhibit systematic racial preferences. A debiasing framework, 
acting alone and without cultural context, thus risks ignoring the 
social justice mission of the law.350 When Charles Lawrence first wrote 
about unconscious racism, he was not simply saying that people act 
unconsciously in biased ways. He was saying that people are 
unconsciously racist and that American culture is responsible.351 Thus, 
as scholars digest yet again the newest piece of evidence that implicit 
 
supported in part by Kang and Banaji’s “fair measures” proposal, which uses a variety of 
evidence on implicit bias to propose a multifaceted framework for progress. See Kang & Banaji, 
supra note 44, at 1065–66. 
 346. See the discussion of intergroup contact theory, supra notes 336–41 and accompanying 
text. 
 347. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 44, at 1067. 
 348. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 336, at 766. 
 349. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 323. 
 350. More detailed discussions of racial history, the American culture of discrimination, and 
its links to equal protection admittedly occur outside the mostly scientific scope of this paper. 
Nonetheless, each of these components must be discussed in the context of implicit racial bias. 
See generally Lawrence, supra note 3 (discussing race in the context of equal protection 
jurisprudence); Yamamoto, supra note 134 (focusing on cultural responsibility in race relations). 
“Debiasing” by its nature is not always culturally ignorant. Kang and Banaji’s model, for 
example, uses debiasing concepts to effectuate slow cultural change. See Kang & Banaji, supra 
note 44, at 1108–10. 
 351. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 324. 
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bias manifests in the legal system, it must be understood that the 
deviation from rational decisionmaking is not simply a cognitive 
glitch, but a meaningful cultural statement that reflects the way 
people unknowingly carry society’s weaknesses with them at all times, 
even when encoding and recalling the simplest of facts. Dealing with 
implicit racial biases, then, requires more than a scientific effort at 
debiasing through cues and primes.352 It requires a recognition that 
their very existence reflects the state of American culture. And this 
recognition, in turn, calls for steps that will facilitate cultural change. 
CONCLUSION 
How can the American legal system stand for justice and fairness 
when it embraces a decisionmaking process that propagates racial 
bias? The automatic and pervasive nature of implicit memory biases 
highlights the difficulty of finding a solution for this moral and 
practical conundrum. As I have argued, the only surefire solution for 
implicit memory bias is cultural change. When racial stereotypes no 
longer disproportionately link minorities to negative traits, implicit 
memory biases will disappear. In the meantime, however, some 
important temporary measures may help lessen the harmful racial 
effects of implicit memory biases. Nonetheless, more research is 
needed. This research should aim to reveal the nature of memory 
biases themselves and the ameliorating efforts that will aid the battle 
against biases in legal decisionmaking. Research should also be 
conducted across legal disciplines to determine the pervasiveness of 
implicit memory biases. These projects might include examinations of 
decisionmaking processes in areas such as employment 
discrimination, property ownership, death penalty, intellectual 
property, and more. 
Although the legal decisionmaking implications are challenging 
enough, implicit memory biases have implications beyond the legal 
system. If they are as pervasive as the research tends to indicate, they 
may affect decisions both big and small—from committees deciding 
which applicant to admit or job seeker to hire (perhaps 
misremembering qualifications) to a donor deciding how much 
money to donate to a charity (perhaps misremembering reputation or 
 
 352. Because cultural change, however, is a major endeavor and will happen slowly (and 
may not happen at all without a sustained effort), the scientific endeavor will continue to be at 
the forefront of implicit bias discourse. 
02__LEVINSON.DOC 12/6/2007  8:48:07 AM 
2007] FORGOTTEN RACIAL EQUALITY 421 
past performance). Future research should thus be conducted not 
only within the legal setting. Only through these projects can legal 
scholars begin to fashion a sophisticated response to the harms 
caused. In the meantime, however, so long as implicit biases go 
unchecked in legal decisionmaking, it is hard to be confident that 
social justice is at hand. 
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APPENDIX A:  DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES 
Below is a list of facts. Some of the facts below accurately 
describe the case you read. Other facts below do not accurately 
describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for “yes”) next to the 
facts that are accurately reported from the case. If a fact does not 
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in 
the case at all, circle “N” (for “no”). 
 
1) James smiled at William after spilling beer on him. Y/N 
2) William and his friend hit James one time each. Y/N 
3) William and James first encountered each other in a bar. Y/N 
4) William wore a tee shirt and jeans. Y/N 
5) After James said “Let it go,” William replied by saying  
“What if we won’t let it go?” Y/N 
6) William hit James in the face immediately after James  
shoved William’s friend. Y/N 
7) After being punched, James took out an object  
from his pocket. Y/N 
8) Before going to the bar, William and his friend ate  
at a local diner. Y/N 
9) James worked as a plumber. Y/N 
10) William punched James from behind. Y/N 
11) William and his friend followed James as he left the bar. Y/N 
12) After James fell to the ground, William kicked him. Y/N 
13) When William hit James in the face, he was really  
trying to push him rather than punch him. Y/N 
14) When they saw him outside a diner, William and his friend 
approached James. Y/N 
15) William was angry that James had spilled beer on  
him in the bar. Y/N 
16) James shoved William. Y/N 
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
Below is a list of facts. Some of the facts below accurately 
describe the case you read. Other facts below do not accurately 
describe the case you read. Please circle “Y” (for “yes”) next to the 
facts that are accurately reported from the case. If a fact does not 
accurately describe the information you read, or if the fact was not in 
the case at all, circle “N” (for “no”). 
 
1) Brenda worked as a marketing clerk. Y/N 
2) Brenda was named employee of the month. Y/N 
3) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she should  
not be terminated without good cause. Y/N 
4) Brenda had permission to use her computer for  
personal use, so long as it occurred during her  
fifteen minute breaks. Y/N 
5) Brenda frequently surfed the web. Y/N 
6) Brenda always completed her assigned work. Y/N 
7) Brenda’s internet blog generated publicity and created  
new business. Y/N 
8) Brenda worked for “Big Burger Company.” Y/N 
9) Brenda’s employment contract stated that she could  
be terminated if she failed to comply with the  
employee handbook. Y/N 
10) Brenda liked hamburgers but not french fries. Y/N 
11) Brenda used her phone to make personal  
long-distance calls. Y/N 
12) Brenda was allowed a one hour lunch break Y/N 
13) Brenda was occasionally sloppy in her work. Y/N 
14) Brenda worked longer hours than was required. Y/N 
15) Brenda posted a blog complaining about the  
company’s burgers. Y/N 
16) Brenda received mixed reviews from superiors. Y/N 
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